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I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual assault of children is a crime of silence. Because offenders
use subtle or blatant coercion to keep children from reporting abuse,
and because children often are taught not to express grievances
against authority figures, victims frequently delay disclosure for
months or even years.' When young victims are disabled, total silence
is virtually ensured.2
Disabled children are attractive targets for abuse because they are
physically unable to resist, lack awareness of what constitutes sexual
abuse, and are isolated from much of society.3 When an abuser is also
the main provider of a disabled child's physical or emotional needs,
the child is even more dependent, compliant, and reluctant or unable
to disclose the abuse.4
These inhibitors to reporting are compounded when a disabled
child cannot communicate in what is considered a normal manner.
One of the largest groups of persons with profound communication im-
1. KATHLEEN COULBORN FALLER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD SEXUAL nALTRrAmENT 51
(1990). See Lucy Berliner & Jon R. Conte, The Process of Victimization: The Vic-
tims' Perspective, 14 CHmD ABUSE & NEGLECT 29 (1990).
2. Reports are made in approximately one in thirty cases of sexual abuse of disabled
persons, compared with one in five cases for non-disabled persons. Deborah
Tharinger et al., Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Children and Adults with
Mental Retardation and Other Handicaps, 14 CH=n ABUSE & NEGLECT 301, 304
(1990). For an in-depth discussion of the vulnerability of disabled children, see
Mary I. Benedict et al., Reported Maltreatment in Children with Multiple Disabil-
ities, 14 CHmD ABUSE & NEGLECT 207 (1990); Sandra L. Elvik et al., Sexual Abuse
in the Developmentally Disabled: Dilemmas of Diagnosis, 14 Cim ABUSE & NE-
GLECT 497 (1990).
3. Sandra S. Cole, Facing the Challenges of Sexual Abuse in Persons with Disabili-
ties, 7 SEXUAITY & DIsABnrry 71, 74 (1986).
4. See David H. Neely, Handicapped Advocacy: Inherent Barriers and Partial Solu-
tions in the Representation of Disabled Children, 33 HASTNGS L.J. 1359 (1982).
For a useful discussion regarding loss of social power of the sexually abused dis-
abled individual, see Cole, supra note 3, at 77-79.
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pairments is the autistic population.5 Because of their unique disor-
der, autistic people face all the barriers confronting other disabled
persons, compounded by the barrier of impaired communication.6
Thus, autistic persons who are psychologically prepared to disclose
abuse may not be physically able to do so.
In an attempt to lessen these communication barriers, researchers
recently have been investigating a technique known as facilitated
communication. 7 Facilitated communication involves teaching dis-
5. Autism is characterized by abnormal social interaction, impaired communication,
and limited activities and interests. AimICA PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAG-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 299.00, at 66 (4th ed.
1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Autistic individuals may exhibit abnormal behavior
such as rocking, distracted eye movements, walking on tiptoe, or poor motor coor-
dination. Persons with autism may ignore sensations such as heat, cold, or pain;
they may bang their heads or bite their hands; they are often extremely sensitive
to sounds and touch; and they may have an exaggerated reaction to lights and
odors. Id. They also may exhibit echolalia, an involuntary echoing of speech re-
cently spoken by another. See STEDAA'WS MEDICAL DICTIONARY 486 (25th ed.
1990). Further, autistic individuals may reverse pronouns, be unable to name
objects, or use idiosyncratic utterances. DSM-IV, supra, at 66-67.
Research suggests that autism affects two to five per 10,000 individuals. Id.
The rate of incidence is four to five times higher in boys than girls, although
autistic girls tend to exhibit more severe mental retardation than autistic boys.
Id. at 68. Despite remarkable advancements in the diagnosis and treatment of
persons with autism, little is known about the etiology of the disorder, although
several theories link autism to neurobiologic and genetic factors. See URA FarrH,
AUTisM: EXPLAING THE ENIGmA 75 (1989). For a revealing discussion of autism
from the autistic individual's perspective, see MARGARET EASTHAM, SILENT
WORDS (1992); TEmPLE GRANDiN & MARGARET M. SCAJUANO, EMERGENCE: LA-
BELED AuT'sTic (1986); DONNA WmLiAms, NOBODY NoWMER (1992).
6. See FrH, supra note 5, at 75.
7. Facilitated communication was first developed by Rosemary Crossley in the
1970s while she worked as an aide in an Australian institution for individuals
with severe physical disabilities. See Rosemary Crossley & Jane Remington-
Gurney, Getting the Words Out: Facilitated Communication Training, 12 ToPics
IN LANGUAGE DIORDERS 29 (1992). Because the most common methods of replac-
ing speech involve complex hand movements such as handwriting and manual
signing, Crossley developed the method of facilitated communication for individu-
als whose communication impairment was compounded by hand-function impair-
ments. ROSEMARY CEOSSLEY, FACILrATED COMNICATION TRAINING 3 (1994).
One of Crossley's patients at the institution was Anne McDonald, a person
severely disabled by cerebral palsy. Crossley believed that McDonald and other
patients with similar physical disorders possessed intelligence that had gone un-
discovered because of physical disabilities. Crossley's work with facilitation ena-
bled McDonald to communicate with Australian authorities and eventually gain
her release from the institution. Id. at 4. Crossley and McDonald later wrote a
book about the experience. RosENARY CROSSLEY & ANNE McDoNALD, ANNM'S
COLMUNG OUT (1980).
In the early 1980s, Crossley and her colleagues began to use facilitation more
extensively at the Dignity through Education and Language Communication
Centre (DEAL) in Melbourne, Australia, extending their training to individuals
who were unable to communicate independently, but for whom independent di-
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abled individuals8 to type on a computer keyboard or alphabet board
with the assistance of another person known as a facilitator.9 The
facilitator's fimction is to support the student's hand, arm, or elbow so
the individual may control his or her hand while typing.lO Ideally, the
rect access with their hands was a realistic goal. Many of these individuals were
diagnosed with disabilities such as autism. Crossley & Remington-Gurney,
supra at 33. For a brief critique of Crossley's research, see Sue Bettison, Correc-
tion to Previous Evaluation of Facilitated Communication, 22 J. AUrISM & DEv.
DISORDERS 450 (1992); Sue Bettison, Letter to the Editor, Informal Evaluation of
Crossley's Facilitated Communication, 21 J. AuTIsM & DEv. DISORDERS 561
(1991).
By the late 1980s, Douglas Biklen from Syracuse University brought facili-
tated communication to the United States and Canada after meeting with
Crossley and her students in Australia. Biklen has explained his findings and
thoughts on facilitated communication through a series of publications. DOUGLAS
BUCLEN, COMMUNICATION UNBOUND (1993); Douglas Biklen, Communication Un-
bound: Autism and Praxis, 60 HARv. EDUC. REv. 242 (1992); Douglas Biklen et
al., Facilitated Communication: Implications for Individuals with Autism, 12
ToPicS IN LANGUAGE DISORDERS 1 (1992); Douglas Biklen et. al., "IAMTNOTA
UTISTIVC ON THJE TYP" ("I'm not Autistic on the Typewriter"), 6 DISABITY,
HANDICAP & Soc'Y 161 (1991); Douglas Biklen, New Words: The Communication
of Students with Autism, 12 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 46 (1991); Douglas
Biklen, Typing to Talk: Facilitated Communication, 1 Am. J. SPEECH-LANGUAGE
PATHOLOGY 15 (1992). Biklen also founded the Facilitated Communication Insti-
tute at Syracuse University and began publishing the Facilitated Communication
Digest.
8. The literature reports the use of facilitated communication among people with
cerebral palsy, Down Syndrome, autism, and other conditions diagnosed as
mental disorders. BIKLEN, COMMUNICATION UNBOUND, supra note 7, at 100-07.
For accounts of other discoveries of similar types of communication techniques
for disabled persons made independent of Crossley, see ROSALIND C. OPPENHE m,
EFFECTIVE TEACHING METHODS FOR AUTISTIC CHILDREN 54-55 (1974)(special edu-
cation teacher providing handwriting support to overcome students' motor skills
disabilities); Mary Stewart Goodwin & T. Campbell Goodwin, In a Dark Mirror,
53 MENTAL HYGIENE 550 (1969)(pediatricians worked with more than 65 autistic
children who communicated on an electric typewriter when given the opportunity
even though they had been diagnosed as illiterate). See also BIKLEN, COMMUNICA-
TION UNBOUND, supra note 7, at 96 (discussing teachers who discovered a form of
facilitated handwriting).
9. CROSSLEY, FACILITATED COMMUNICATION TRAINING, supra note 7, at 3. The
facilitator usually is a parent, teacher, or a staff member of a mental health insti-
tution. Biklen, Autism and Praxis, supra note 7, at 298.
10. The beginning phase of facilitated communication training typically consists of a
student placing his or her hand down into the facilitator's upturned hand with
the facilitator isolating the index finger if necessary. While the student's arm is
moving forward, the facilitator supports the arm and controls extraneous move-
ments. See CROSSLEY, FACILITATED COMMUNICATION TRAINING, supra note 7, at
19-20. This procedure stabilizes the wrist enabling the student to move his or
her hand toward the keyboard. Bilden, New Words, supra note 7, at 46-47. In
addition to providing physical support, some researchers believe the facilitator's
function is to provide emotional support and encouragement and to remind the
student to maintain focus. Douglas Bilden, Autism Orthodoxy Versus Free
Speech: A Reply to Cummins and Prior, 62 HA{v. EDUC. REv. 242, 243 (1992).
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level of support diminishes over time as the student's skills and confi-
dence increase."1 Some students eventually type with a light touch to
the elbow, while others require only the facilitator's touch on the
shoulder. In some cases contact is eliminated entirely and the student
achieves complete independence in communication.1 2
As the procedure has gained recognition and become more wide-
spread, individuals with communication impairments have used the
facilitated communication technique to disclose sexual abuse.1S This
method of disclosure has, however, generated'considerable debate in
both the scientific and legal communities.14
One of the most intensely debated issues is the scientific validation
of the technique.'5 Critics of facilitated communication claim no sys-
tematic research supports the conclusion that facilitation results in
actual communication. 16 These researchers suggest that application
11. Crossley & Remington-Gurney, supra note 7, at 39-42.
12. See Crossley & Remington-Gurney, supra note 7. See also CROSSLEY, FAcI-
TATED COM-NICATION TRANING, supra note 7, at 113-27 (providing Crossley's
description of case studies detailing the progress of two students toward in-
dependent communication).
13. See Ann Botash et al., Evaluation of Children Who Have Disclosed Sexual Abuse
Via Facilitated Communication, 148 ARCHIVES IN PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT
MEDICINE 1282 (1994)(analyzing 13 cases of facilitated disclosures of sexual
abuse); Bryna Siegel, Brief Report: Assessing Allegations of Sexual Molestation
Made Through Facilitated Communication, 25 J. AUTisM & DEV. DIsoRDERS 319
(1995); Gordon Dillow, Teacher Says Method That Helps Disabled Ruined Him,
L.A. Tzits, Jan. 24, 1993, at JI; Eugene L. Meyer, Autistic Girl Barred From
Testifying, WASH. PosT, April 23, 1994, at B5; Gail Randall, Live-in Aide Con-
victed of Sexual Abuse, WICErrA EAGLE, March 31, 1993, at Ia.
14. See John E.B. Myers, The Tendency of the Legal System to Distort Scientific and
Clinical Innovations: Facilitated Communication as a Case Study, 18 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 505 (1994); Elliott W. Simon et al., Keeping Facilitated Com-
munication in Perspective, 33 MENTAL RETARDATION 338 (1995).
15. Validation refers to quantitative studies that consistently demonstrate universal
verification that accurate communication results from facilitation. Robert A.
Cummins & Margot P. Prior, Autism and Assisted Communication: A Response
to Biklen, 62 HARv. EDUC. REv. 228 (1992). Cunmins and Prior use the term
"assisted" rather than "facilitated." See also Elliott W. Simon, A Naturalistic Ap-
proach to the Validation of Facilitated Communication, 24 J. AuTsM & DEv. Dis-
ORDERS 647 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Stephen N. Calculator & Karen M. Singer, Letter to the Editor, Prelimi-
nary Validation Information of Facilitated Communication, 13 Topics IN LAN-
GUAGE DISORDERS ix (1992); W. David Crews, An Evaluation of Facilitated
Communication in a Group of Nonverbal Individuals with Mental Retardation,
25 J. AuTisM & Dzv. DisoRDFRs 205 (1995); Michael Eberlin et al., Facilitated
Communication: A Failure to Replicate the Phenomenon, 23 J. AuTIm & Dv.
DISORDERS 507 (1993); Alan Hudson et al., BriefReport: A Case Study Assessing
the Validity of Facilitated Communication, 23 J. Aunsm & DEv. DIsORDERS 165
(1993); Lars Klewe, Brief Report: An Empirical Evaluation of Spelling Boards as
a Means of Communication for the Multihandicapped, 23 J. AUTISM & DEV. Dis-
ORDERS 559 (1993); Susan Moore et al., BriefReport: Evaluation of Eight Case
Studies of Facilitated Communication, 23 J. AUTISM & DRY. DISORDERS 531
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of the technique to the autistic population has reached the status of a
"minor epidemic" despite a dearth of scientific validation. 17 Some re-
searchers state that all relevant studies show that facilitators manip-
ulate responses by cuingls the student or actually typing for the
student.19 These critics argue that the value of the technique will re-
main in question until independent scientific evidence is available re-
garding facilitator influence. 20
Conversely, proponents of facilitated communication note that
initial research was not designed to scientifically validate the tech-
nique.21 Instead, this research was designed to examine the relation-
(1993); Susan Moore et al., Brief Report: Facilitator-Suggested Conversational
Evaluation of Facilitated Communication, 23 J. AUTisM & DEv. DISORDERS 541
(1993); Margot P. Prior & Robert A. Cummins, Questions About Facilitated Com-
munication and Autism, 22 J. AUTSM & DEV. DISORDERS 331 (1992); Marcia
Datlow Smith et al., Facilitated Communication: The Effects of Facilitator
Knowledge and Level of Assistance on Output, 24 J. AUTISM & DEv. DISORDERS
357 (1994); Carol A. Vazquez, Brief Report: A Multitask Controlled Evaluation of
Facilitated Communication, 24 J. AUTISM & DEv. DISoRDERS 369 (1994); Douglas
L. Wheeler et al., An Experimental Assessment of Facilitated Communication, 31
MENTAL RETARDATION 49 (1993).
17. See Prior & Cummins, supra note 16, at 332.
18. See Prior & Cummins, supra note 16, at 333; Robert A. Regal et al., Facilitated
Communication: An Experimental Evaluation, 24 J. AUTISM & Dav. DISORDERS
345, 353-54 (1994); Wheeler et al., supra note 16, at 49. Cuing refers to conscious
or unconscious conduct by the facilitator that communicates to the student what
letters the facilitator wants the student to type. Cuing, as used by critics of facili-
tated communication, does not necessarily involve cognitive awareness on the
part of the student as to what he or she types. It can be merely a motor response
to a stimulus. See Cummins & Prior, supra note 15, at 232. Cummins and Prior
call this a "Clever Hans Effect" in reference to a horse whose owner claimed to
have taught the horse to communicate. Id. at 232-33. According to the owner,
each letter of the alphabet corresponded to a number, and the horse would tap
out words and sentences to communicate. See Bilden, Free Speech, supra note 10,
at 249.
19. Wheeler et al., supra note 16, at 58. Some researchers argue that the technique's
objective must be clear in order to determine the impact of cuing on the communi-
cation. If facilitation is characterized as a training procedure for developing lin-
guistic and cognitive skills over a period of years, then cuing may be considered
part of that process, just as it is a normal part of language acquisition in very
young children. Vazquez, supra note 16, at 374. The issue of cuing is not as
important to people who use facilitation as a part of a long-term teaching process
rather than as a means of communication. Moore et al., Evaluation of Eight Case
Studies, supra note 16, at 538.
20. Bettison, Correction to Previous Evaluation, supra note 7, at 450. Bettison's con-
cern is that facilitation competes with an educational approach to autism that
emphasizes slowly teaching material appropriate to the student's cognitive devel-
opment. Bettison, Informal Evaluation, supra note 7, at 561. Of course, this ap-
proach assumes a low level of cognitive development that proponents of
facilitated communication do not accept. BIEN, COMMUNICATION UNBOUND,
supra note 7, at 173-89.
21. See BIKLEN, COMMUNICATION UNBOUND, supra note 7, at 3-4. In fact, Professor
Biklen states that when he began to study Crossley's students, he knew very lit-
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ship of facilitated communication to autism, reflecting an attempt to
generate, rather than test, hypotheses.22 In addition, these propo-
nents argue that existing quantitative and qualitative research dem-
onstrates the validity of facilitated communication. 23 Moreover, they
note that recent research designed to be statistically experimental and
capable of replication has documented successful message-passing
through facilitation.24 Finally, proponents take issue with the meth-
tie about facilitated communication and what he did know challenged his tradi-
tional belief concerning the abilities of autistic individuals. Consequently, he did
not assume the validity of facilitated communication or of a "new" approach to
autism. Id. at 1-4.
22. Proponents state that their qualitative studies disclose several factors which sup-
port the authenticity of facilitated communication, the most compelling of which
are: (a) individuals convey information unknown to the facilitator, such as the
child's new address, weekend activities or college level information unknown to
the facilitator; (b) different individuals reveal unique personalities even though
they share a common facilitator; (c) individuals remain consistent in writing style
although they use several facilitators whose own writing styles differ from the
studenfs; and (d) individuals become increasingly independent in their typing
ability, with some students eventually typing with just a touch to their elbow or
shoulder, or with no contact at all. Biklen et al., "IAMNNOTA UTISTIVC ON
THdE TYP", supra note 7, at 174; Missy Morton, Not Being Able to Speak Doesn't
Mean I Can't Tell: Facilitated Communication and Disclosures of Abuse, 12
A.BA. Juv. & CHILD WELFRE L. REP. 42,43 (1993). See CROssLEY, FACILITATED
COzmnmCATION TRAINING, supra note 7, at 89.
Responding to opponents' assertions regarding the possibility of influence if
the facilitator has any physical contact with a student, Biklen asserts:
[Critics] have not explained to us how it would be possible for a
facilitator to manipulate any person, let alone a person with autism who
cannot speak and who has a range of extraneous behavior including
hand flapping, to type out statements such as 'NOSEY PEOPLE TO
EVEN WANT TO SEE ME' through cues of a person who rests his or her
hand on the communicator's shoulder.
Biklen, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 245.
23. Biklen, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 252-54. One quantitative study was con-
ducted by the Australian government when facilitated communication came
under attack in that country. INTELLCTUAL DIsABmIry RFVIEW PANEL (IDRP),
REPORT To TnE DIRECTOR-GENERAL ON THE RELIABImTY AND VALmrrY OF ASSISTED
COMmUNICATION (Melbourne, Australia 1989)(unpublished report)(on file with
the American Prosecutors Research Institute). Although the study notes that
students can be influenced by facilitators, it also recognizes the validity of the
communication of four of six subjects. Id. at 40. Critics dispute the IDRP's con-
clusions and claim that this study does not support the validity of facilitated com-
munication. Cummins & Prior, supra note 15, at 235-38.
24. Donald N. Cardinal et al., An Investigation of Authorship in Facilitated Commu-
nication, 34 MENTAL RETARDATION (forthcoming 1996)(pre-publication summary
of the study on file with the American Prosecutors Research Institute). Cardi-
nal's study analyzed the communication of 43 students who use facilitated com-
munication, the majority of whom had been diagnosed with autism or mental
retardation. Each student was shown a flash card while the facilitator was not
present. The facilitator then entered the room, at which time the student typed
the word with the facilitator. Sessions of five such trials were conducted three
times per week for six weeks. This resulted in 90 trials per student and more
1995] 607
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odology used by certain facilitation opponents, suggesting that some
research methods have been designed to produce failure.25
In sum, those who question the validity of facilitated communica-
tion claim that inadequate evidence is available regarding facilitator
influence.26 Those who support the authenticity of communication re-
ceived through facilitation assert that sufficient research has been
conducted to prove accurate communication occurs.27
The debate in the legal community stems primarily from com-
plaints of child sexual abuse disclosed through facilitated communica-
tion.28 The issue confronting the legal system is whether in-court
testimony elicited through this type of communication should be per-
than 3800 total trials. The results were compared to students' message-passing
ability without facilitation. Id.
Approximately one-third of the students demonstrated a substantial increase
in message-passing with facilitation, providing evidence that these individuals
were able to consistently author information using facilitated communication.
Thirty-nine percent showed a lesser degree of improvement and 26 percent
showed no improvement. The researchers found that even those students who
eventually were successful in passing messages required several sessions before
substantial improvement was found.
Cardinal and his colleagues concluded from their research that students often
need practice with testing procedures before conclusions are drawn about their
ability to communicate. The authors state in summary: "[Flacilitated communi-
cation may be a reasonable method of instruction for the development of commu-
nication for some people with severe communication disorders when used
properly." Id.
25. Among other criticisms, proponents assert earlier methodologies required short
or single word answers from students with "word finding problems" resulting
from expressive aphasia. CRossLEY, FACILITATED COMMUNICATION TRAINING,
supra note 7, at 75. "Aphasia" is the loss or impairment of the ability to use
words or sounds; "expressive aphasia" affects the ability to speak or write. Id. at
134.
In addition, Cardinal suggests that single point-in-time studies do not accu-
rately measure a person's ability to communicate via facilitated communication.
Rather, a person's performance must be measured repeatedly over time for an
accurate assessment. Cardinal et al., supra note 24. See BM rN, COMMUNICA-
TION UNBOUND, supra note 7, at 126.
Further, individuals may refuse to participate in facilitated communication if
they feel they are being tested, deceived, or not respected. CROSSLEY, FACILI-
TATED CoMMUNIcATION TRAINING, supra note 7, at 43-46. Crossley asserts that
the ultimate validation of facilitation is to bring people to the stage where they
can type independently. Id. at 86.
26. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 16, at 366.
27. Biklen, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 252-53.
28. For examples of disclosures of sexual abuse made through facilitated communica-
tion, see Sally Bligh & Phyllis Kupperman, Brief Report: Facilitated Communi-
cation Evaluation Procedure Accepted in a Court Case, 23 J. AUTIsM & DEv.
DisoRDERS 553 (1993); Botash et al., supra note 13, at 1286-87; Sharon L. Hostler
et al., Childhood Sexual Abuse Reported by Facilitated Communication, 91 PEDI-
ATRICs 1190 (1993). See also supra note 13.
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mitted. Courts faced with this issue have adopted widely varying
approaches.
Some courts view facilitated communication testimony as an issue
of competency that should be decided on a case-by-case basis.29 Under
this analysis, the determination of whether a witness is communicat-
ing through facilitated communication is analogous to cases in which
witnesses communicate through translators.30 If the proponent of the
testimony demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that the com-
munication is being accurately translated, the witness is allowed totestify.31
Other courts view facilitation as a novel scientific technique that
must be subjected to rules governing scientific evidence.32 Relying
primarily on the rule enunciated in Frye v. United States,33 these
courts hold that facilitated communication must be generally accepted
in the scientific community before a witness should be allowed to tes-
tify through the technique.34 Courts adhering to this view use an ap-
proach similar to that used with hypnotically affected testimony: a
person who has been hypnotized generally is not allowed to testify as
to facts recalled during hypnosis because there is no agreement in the
scientific community that hypnosis produces reliable memories.35 Us-
ing similar reasoning, some courts hold that a witness may not testify
using facilitated communication until there is general agreement in
the scientific community that the technique produces reliable
communication.3 6
Barring a class of individuals from all access to the courts is an
extremely serious proposition. When the class of people is disabled,
the consequence of not allowing juries to hear complaints of abuse is
tremendous. Of equal importance, however, is the threat of incarcer-
ating people based on unreliable evidence. The legal system, there-
fore, must be equipped to address this situation fairly and with the
process due both victim and accused.
This Article argues that facilitated communication testimony must
be analyzed as ordinary lay testimony rather than as a scientific tech-
nique. Part H discusses cases involving third-party assistance of in-
court testimony. Part III discusses cases involving out-of-court scien-
tific procedures potentially affecting in-court testimony. Part IV ana-
lyzes the varying approaches of courts currently struggling with
29. See infra notes 224-52 and accompanying text.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 227-32.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 227-32.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 214-23.
33. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 214-19.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 214-19.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 214-19. See also 1 JOHN E.B. MYERs, Evi-
DENCE iN Cnn= ABUsE & NEGLECT CASES § 2.12, at 44-47 (Supp. 1995).
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facilitated communication. Finally, Part V discusses which legal the-
ory is applicable for determining the admissibility of facilitated
communication.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY FROM WITNESSES WHO
REQUIRE IN-COURT ASSISTANCE TO
COMMUNICATE
Children and witnesses with disabilities historically have received
special consideration when testifying. Courts address two issues
when such testimony is proffered. First, courts examine whether the
witness is competent to testify, and second, courts set standards for
use of a translator or other person to assist with the transmission of
the witness' testimony. The following section analyzes the rules
courts have developed to address each of these issues.
A. Competence of Special Classes of Witnesses
1. Witnesses with Physical and Mental Disabilities
Witnesses whose physical disabilities seriously interfered with
their communication were ruled incompetent to testify at common
law.3 7 Blackstone stated: "[A] man who is born deaf, dumb, and
blind, is looked upon by the law in the same state with an idiot; he
being supposed incapable of any understanding, as wanting all those
senses which furnish the human mind with ideas."38 Stated other-
wise: "[T]he testimony of a witness deaf from childhood, and unable to
understand, or express herself intelligibly, has been rejected."39 Simi-
larly, a criminal defendant who was hearing and speech impaired at
birth was presumed to be an "idiot" and thus incompetent to stand
trial unless the defendant demonstrated "use of understanding."40
The ancient presumption of incompetence for hearing and speech
impaired witnesses has long been abolished.41 Courts now treat hear-
37. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 370c (John Wigmore
ed., 16th ed., Little Brown 1899) (1842).
38. 1 BIAcKsToNE, COmNTRa1IES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 304 (David S.
Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thorne eds., 1978) (1769).
39. SIDNEY PHMSON, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE § 1515, at 582 (Michael Argyle ed., 10th
ed. 1963).
40. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., 1971) (1736). It is
important to note that even when courts were disposed to exclude testimony of
disabled witnesses, they recognized that a witness who could show an ability to
communicate would be allowed to testify. Id. However, the burden was on the
proponent of the testimony to overcome the presumption of incompetence.
41. State v. Butler, 138 N.W. 383, 384 (Iowa 1912)(hearing and speech impaired wit-
ness with "sufficient mental capacity to be able to communicate his ideas by signs
or in writing" is competent); State v. Howard, 24 S.W. 41, 45 (Mo. 1893)(presump-




ing and speech impaired witnesses as they do any other witness, al-
lowing them to testify and requiring competence to be demonstrated
only when there is at least prima facie evidence of incompetence. 42 As
Greenleaf stated more than 150 years ago:
A deaf-and-dumb person, in the times of less accurate knowledge, was treated
as presumably an imbecile and therefore as incompetent unless shown to be
sufficiently intelligent. To-day, there appears to be no such presumption, and
such persons may testify so far as any means of communication are
available.4 3
No courts in the United States today prohibit a witness' testimony
solely because the person cannot speak or hear.4 4 The court in Kley v.
Abell45 stated succinctly: "Those cases dealing with the testimony of
witnesses unable to speak or hear have uniformly held that they are
not thereby deemed incompetent merely because of that disability."
An early explanation of the modern test for determining competency
was given in Bugg v. Town of Houlka:4 6
The doctrine announced in Blackstone's day has been largely relaxed, if not
altogether abolished, and deaf and dumb persons are now generally accepted
as competent witnesses. Of course, the showing must be made in any given
case that the witness has a system of communication, and, if otherwise compe-
tent, his testimony is received. 4 7
The admissibility of testimony from witnesses with mental or develop-
mental disabilities 48 has been similarly analyzed, with most states
creating a presumption of competency.4 9 The rationale for allowing
42. 2 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMiON LAw § 498, at 706
(Chadbourn rev. 1979).
43. 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 37, § 370c, at 511 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted).
44. For a list of cases, see 2 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 498, at 706; Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Deaf-Mute As Witness, 50 A-L.R. 4th 1188 (1986)(citing cases).
45. 483 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
46. 84 So. 387 (Miss. 1920).
47. Id. at 388.
48. The medical definition of a developmental disability is "a category of cognitive,
emotional, or physical handicapping conditions that appear in infancy or child-
hood and are related directly to abnormal sensory or motor development, matura-
tion or function; the resultant impairment involves a failure or delay in
progressing through the normal developmental milestones of childhood."
STEDMAN'S MEnicAL DICTONARY 442 (25th ed. 1990). Autism, cerebral palsy, and
mental retardation are examples of developmental disabilities. CHILDREN wrrH
AuTism 278 (Michael D. Powers ed., 1989). Developmental disability is defined in
the Americans with Disabilities Act as a "severe, chronic disability resulting from
an impairment which occurred before the individual reached the age of 22 and
which significantly limits the person's functional ability." 42 U.S.C. § 6001
(Supp. 1994).
49. As explained by.Wigmore:
In earlier times, all persons afflicted with marks of feeble-mindedness
("idiots"), or natal mental defects, and even deaf-mutes or the mutes,
were presumed to be incapable of testifying, until the contrary was
shown. Today this presumption has disappeared.
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testimony of physically and mentally disabled witnesses is bluntly ex-
plained by Wigmore:
Here is a person on the stand; perhaps he is a total imbecile, in manner, but
perhaps also there will be a gleam of sense here and there in his story. The
jury had better be given the opportunity of disregarding the evident nonsense
and of accepting such sense as may appear. There is usually abundant evi-
dence ready at hand to discredit him when he is truly an imbecile or suffers
under a dangerous delusion. It is simpler and safer to let the jury perform the
process of measuring the impeached testimony and of sifting out whatever
traces of truth may seem to be contained in it.50
2 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 498, at 706 (footnotes omitted). The Federal Rules of
Evidence follow Wigmore's view, eliminating the common law rule of presumed
incompetency of disabled witnesses and creating a presumption of competency for
all witnesses. FED. R. EviD. 601. See McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 62, at 156-57
(Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed., 1984). Many states have adopted some version of
this rule. See United States v. Gutman, 725 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1984)(undis-
puted findings that a person had serious mental illness for one year prior to trial
was not in itself sufficient to require a competency hearing when the trial court
concluded the witness was able to tell the truth and understand the oath); State
v. Watkins, 857 P.2d 300 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)(trial court not required to make
sua sponte competency determination of developmentally disabled witness); Peo-
ple v. Davis, 585 N.E.2d 214, 222 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)(Down's Syndrome does not
disqualify a witness); People v. Alexander, 724 P.2d 1304 (Colo. 1986)(slightly
retarded hearing and speech impaired witness presumed competent); Ingram v.
State, 463 N.E.2d 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)(court not required to assess sua sponte
competency of mentally retarded witness); People v. Spencer, 457 N.E.2d 473 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983)(witnesses with mental impairments benefit from a presumption of
competence which the opponent must rebut); Mickens v. State, 428 So. 2d 202
(Ala. Crim. App. 1983)(court may swear witness if no objection). Cf Sizemore v.
State, 416 S.E.2d 500 (Ga. 1992)(mentally retarded children not exempted from
competency challenge because child competency statute applies only to children
who do not understand an oath); State v. Kinney, 519 N.E.2d 1386 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987)(court required to test competency when it was called into question);
Darnell v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1977)(trial court may have to
conduct an inquiry on its own if there are "manifest" signs of incompetence).
50. 2 WIMoRE, supra note 42, § 501, at 709. See also 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE
IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES § 2.3, at 69 (1992).
A small minority of states maintain a presumption that persons of unsound
mind are incompetent to testify. See, e.g., State v. Dighera, 617 S.W.2d 524, 526
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981)("a person confined to a mental institution under lawful pro-
cess or adjudicated as mentally ill is absolutely incompetent as a witness"). In
such cases, the burden of overcoming this presumption is placed on the proponent
of the witness. Id. In Dighera, the witness was visually impaired as well as hear-
ing and speech impaired. She communicated by finger-spelling through a trans-
lator. The court determined through examination of her records at the
institution that she was admitted to the institution for shelter, not for treatment
of a mental illness. Because she was able to "notice, recollect and communicate"
the necessary events, she was found competent to testify. Id. at 527.
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2. Competence of Children
Testimony of children historically was received with the same
skepticism as testimony of disabled witnesses. 5 1 Pointing to the al-
leged unreliability52 of young children's testimony, courts presumed
children below a certain age were incompetent, requiring a proponent
of a child's testimony to affirmatively prove competence for the testi-
mony to be admissible.53 However, more than 200 years ago English
courts ruled that there is no age below which a person should be
deemed incompetent to testify,54 and courts since that time have
taken a much more expansive view toward the admissibility of the tes-
timony of child witnesses.55 Thus, even very young children are pre-
sumed competent and may be permitted to testify unless their
testimony has no probative value whatsoever,56 or would be unfairly
prejudicial because a jury would base its decision on sympathy for a
child rather than on substantive testimony.57
51. 1 MYERs, supra note 50, § 2.2, at 65.
52. The point at which a child's communication becomes "reliable" is greatly debated.
Some researchers suggest that very young children can be misled more easily
than older children and therefore claim the testimony of very young children is
inherently unreliable. See Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the
Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 403
(1993)(collecting research on the suggestibility of child witnesses). On the other
hand, a considerable body of research demonstrates children have a remarkable
degree of resistance to suggestion. See, e.g., Gail S. Goodman & Allison Clarke-
Stewart, Suggestibility in Children's Testimony: Implications for Sexual Abuse
Investigations, in TiE SuGGEsTmnxrY Or Ci=REN's RECOLLECTIONS 92 (John
Doris ed., 1990). Other studies provide techniques for improving accurate recall
in children's testimony. See Karen J. Saywitz et al., Effects of Cognitive Inter-
viewing and Practice on Children's Recall Performance, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
744 (1992).
53. At common law there was a rebuttable presumption that children below the age
of 14 were incompetent to testify. ROBERT M. HoRowrrz & HOWARD A. DAVmsoN,
LEGAL RiGrrs OF CH11DREN § 3.18, at 107 (1984).
54. Rex v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1770). Professor Myers cites Rex
v. Brasier as the first case to create a presumption of competency for child wit-
nesses. 1 MYERs, supra note 50, § 2.2, at 67.
More than 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court abolished the pre-
sumption of incompetency, upholding the testimonial competence of a five-year-
old. Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895). See also People v. Draper,
389 N.W.2d 89 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)(three-year-old victim competent to testify).
For a list of cases in which very young children have been found competent to
testify, see 1 MYERS, supra note 50, § 2.1, at 60 n.2.
55. For example, Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 601 creates a presumption that all
witnesses are competent. Based on a literal reading of this rule, some courts
allow all witnesses to testify as long as the testimony is relevant and not unduly
prejudicial.
56. See State v. Dwyer, 440 N.W.2d 344 (Wis. 1989), cited in 1 MYERS, supra note 50,
§ 2.4, at 70 n.48.
57. 1 MYERS, supra note 50, § 2.4, at 71. It is under the authority of Rule 403 or an
equivalent-preventing unfair prejudice-that courts apply the traditional com-
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Most states have followed the example of the federal system by
presuming competency for all witnesses regardless of age,58 while
other states have created a presumption of competency specific to
child witnesses.59 A very few states retain a rebuttable presumption
of incompetence for child witnesses.60 Regardless of such statutory
presumptions, trial courts have broad discretion in determining com-
petency,6 1 and a court's finding regarding competence will be reversed
only when this discretion is abused.62
B. Admissibility of Testimony From Witnesses Who
Communicate With Third Party Intervention
Once the presumption of incompetence for witnesses with disabili-
ties was removed, courts had to establish a system for determining the
admissibility of testimony translated from disabled witnesses. This
was particularly true for hearing-impaired witnesses who needed
translators, although the same rules have been applied to witnesses
who needed interpretation for other reasons. The following section
surveys the admissibility of testimony from all witnesses who rely on
a third party to communicate in court.
1. Sign Language
Persons with communication impairments use diverse modes of
communication. While some disabled individuals use their voices to
petency test even with a presumption of competency. See, e.g., State v. Fulton,
742 P.2d 1208, 1218 n.15 (Utah 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988).
58. See FED. R. EvID. 601.
59. ANERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, LEGISLATION REGARDING THE COM-
PETENCY OF CHILD WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN CRMINAL TILs (current through
December 31, 1994)(summarizing state and federal legislation in the United
States)(available from the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect
Information).
60. See IDAHO CODE § 9-202 (1985); MIcH. R. EvIm. 601; Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060(2)
(1988); N.J. R. Evm. 17 (1967); N.Y. R. Evm. 60.20 (1975). See also Nora A.
Uehlein, Annotation, Witnesses: Child Competency Statutes, 60 A.L.R. 4th § 30,
at 369 (1988).
61. Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 885 (1979). In the context of child witnesses, Wigmore stated:
[T]he trial court must be the one to determine finally, upon all the cir-
cumstances, whether the child has sufficient intelligence.... Neverthe-
less, upper courts, instead of enforcing this principle rigidly, continue to
revise rulings upon the competency of children whom they have never
seen or heard. Time should not be wasted on such a task.
2 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 507, at 714-15 (emphasis in original)(citations
omitted).
62. Id. An example of abuse of discretion would be the trial court's refusal to ex-
amine a child who is offered as a witness when there is evidence of the child's
incompetence. HoRowrrz & DAVIDSON, supra note 53, § 3.18, at 110.
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communicate, others use sign language,63 a combination of talking
and signing,64 or unique signs or sounds understood only by friends
and relatives.65 If a communication-impaired individual testifies in a
judicial proceeding, a third party most likely will be asked to interpret
or aid in the transmission of the testimony. Courts have articulated
three prerequisites to the admissibility of such testimony.
First, the translator must be qualified. Sign language interpreters
were found qualified at common law as long as they demonstrated to
the court's satisfaction an ability to communicate with the witness.66
The translator was required to show he or she could understand the
signs used by the witness and "well and truly interpret the mean-
ing."67 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, interpreters may be
qualified based on personal experience, training, or formal educa-
tion.68 Although the Federal Rules do not require certification,69 fed-
eral courts are required under the Court Interpreters Act70 to use
interpreters certified by the Director of the Administrative Offices of
the United States Courts.71 In many jurisdictions72 accurate inter-
63. OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VOICES: JOURNEY INTO THE WORLD OF THE DEAF 9 (1989).
The most prominent form of sign language in the United States is American Sign
Language, although it is only one of many forms of sign language in existence.
Id. at 24.
64. Some hearing impaired persons communicate through lip reading or speech read-
ing, with the assistance of an oral interpreter who silently repeats the words of a
speaker for the speech-reader using facial expressions and body language. BAR-
BARA CHERTOI, EYES, HANDS, VOICES: A DEAF AERmICAN MONOGRAPH 24 (1990).
See United States v. Lyons, 33 M.J. 543 (1991)(witness' sign language vocabulary
did not exceed two hundred words so she augmented her use of signs by the use of
gestures and sounds).
65. This form of communication is termed "idiosyncratic communication" in this Arti-
cle for ease of reference.
66. State v. DeWolf, 8 Conn. 93 (1830).
67. Bugg v. Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387, 388 (Miss. 1920). See Brown v. State, 331
So. 2d 820 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)(hearing and speech impaired witness allowed
to testify through an interpreter).
68. Rule 604 states "[alan interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules relat-
ing to qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation
to make a true translation." Rule 702, governing qualifications of experts, allows
an expert to be qualified based on "knowledge, skill, experience, training or edu-
cation." FED. R. Evm. 702.
69. It is unclear whether a person who is certified under the Court Interpreters Act
can be subjected to further scrutiny under Rule 604. See 27 CHARLES A. WIGrr
& VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6054, at 313 (1990).
Wright and Gold argue that the purpose of the Act is to ensure a minimal level of
qualification for interpreters in federal court. Id.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1988). The Act applies whenever a presiding judicial officer
finds that a defendant's ability to comprehend the proceedings or communicate
with counsel is "inhibited" by language or hearing problems. See United States v.
Perez, 918 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1990).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(a) (1988). A certified interpreter is to be used when a witness
speaks a language other than English, or "suffers from a hearing impairment...
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pretation does not require a literal translation73 because most other
languages, whether foreign or signed, do not have word-for-word
equivalents to spoken English.
Once an interpreter is found to be qualified, courts have no practi-
cal way to contemporaneously determine whether the interpreter is
translating accurately. Consequently, the second requirement in de-
termining the admissibility of translated testimony is of paramount
importance: an interpreter must be sworn to interpret truthfully.74
In most cases it is impossible to simultaneously verify in court the
accuracy of what is translated because no one in the proceeding other
than the witness and translator knows the language. In the context of
foreign language translation, Wright and Gold explain both the prob-
lem and the solution provided by the Federal Rules:
Enforcement at the trial level would require either that the judge himself be
fluent in the foreign language spoken by the witness or hear testimony from
interpreters employed by the parties on the subject of the accuracy of the
translation provided by the court's interpreter .... Rule 604 reflects the rea-
sonable conclusion that, in light of these practical problems, the court should
normally depend on the qualification and oath or affirmation requirements of
Rule 604 to produce an accurate translation.
Accordingly, as with foreign language cases, courts in cases of signed
testimony must rely on the truthful interpretation by a translator
under oath.7 5
so as to inhibit such witness' comprehension of questions and the presentation of
such testimony." 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d) (1988). A certified interpreter must be used
when "reasonably available." Id. When not reasonably available, courts look
only to the interpreter's qualifications. FED. R. Evm. 604, 702. See United States
v. Ball, 988 F.2d 7, 9-10 (5th Cir. 1993)(examining qualifications of a wife inter-
preting for her husband); Fairbanks v. Cowan, 551 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1977)(im-
paired speech interpreted by father).
72. Many courts do not allow interpreters to paraphrase or edit. See United States v.
Torres, 793 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1986). Similarly, a House Report discussing the
Court Interpreter's Act anticipated that translations which "allow the interpreter
to condense and distill the speech of the speaker" would be used "very sparingly."
H.R. REP. No. 95-1687, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978). See 27 WIGr & GOLD,
supra note 69, § 6055, at 322, n.18. Wright and Gold call this view "simplistic"
and cite cases recognizing that most languages do not have exact equivalents in
another language. 27 WMiGIr & GOLD, supra note 69, § 6055, at 322-23.
73. See Garcia v. State, 463 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. 1984)(interpretation proper even
though interpreter for hearing and speech impaired witness could not always
translate word for word because a person of normal intelligence could understand
the witness' testimony); State v. Galloway, 284 S.E.2d 509 (N.C. 1981)(translator
for hearing and speech impaired witness could not literally translate without free
conversation between her and the witness; the court held that any confusion from
the interpretation would go to the weight and not the admissibility of the testi-
mony). See also 27 WMiGHT & GOLD, supra note 69, § 6055, at 322-23.
74. See 27 WRiGI & GOLD, supra note 69, § 6055, at 322-23.
75. See 27 WasHT & GOLD, supra note 69, § 6055, at 321.
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The third requirement is that the interpreter not demonstrate a
bias against the party-opponent. 76 While the interpreter does not
have to be completely impartial,77 the court will consider the degree of
personal involvement of the interpreter, the circumstances of the case,
and the availability of an alternative translator.78 For example, in
Prince v. State,79 the trial court allowed the husband of a hearing and
speech impaired rape victim to translate the victim's sign language.
The court held that it was not an abuse of discretion to allow a close
relative to act as interpreter,O noting that there was no showing that
the husband was unqualified, interpreted inaccurately, or did any-
thing to harm the defendant's rights.S1
2. Idiosyncratic Language
In many cases, witnesses with hearing and speech impairments do
not learn sign language through formal education.8 2 Instead, they
create their own system of communicating with relatives and friends
with whom they spend significant amounts of time. Persons who
translate these idiosyncratic forms of communication must satisfy the
same requirements as those translating standardized methods of com-
munication such as sign language.S3
76. United States v. Ball, 988 F.2d 7, 9-10 (5th Cir. 1993).
77. See Robinson v. State, 444 So. 2d 902 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)(holding that deaf-
mute victim's interpreter in rape trial does not have to be the least interested
person available).
78. United States v. Ball, 988 F.2d 7, 10 (5th Cir. 1993).
79. 336 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
80. Id. at 142.
81. Id. See also Burgess v. State, 53 So. 2d 568 (Ala. 1951)(brother allowed to trans-
late for hearing and speech disabled sister); Almon v. State, 109 So. 371 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1926)(mother of complaining witness with speech impediment properly al-
lowed to interpret); Claycomb v. State, 211 P. 429 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923)(hus-
band interpreted for Spanish-speaking wife); State v. Smith, 102 S.W. 526 (Mo.
1907)(professor of hearing and speech impaired witness allowed to translate);
State v. Bums, 78 N.W. 681 (Iowa 1899)(not an abuse of discretion for trial court
to allow a friend of the hearing and speech impaired witness to act as
interpreter).
82. See Harry Bornstein, A Manual Communication Overview, in MANuAL ComntnI-
CATION: IPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION 21-44 (Harry Bornstein ed., 1990).
83. See Kley v. Abell, 483 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972)(trial court erred in failing
to assess the qualifications of brother who interpreted for witness who was capa-
ble of communicating "only by means of making grunts, gestures and motions");
People v. Thompson, 309 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1970), aff'd, 268 N.E.2d 804 (1971)(de-
fendant not prejudiced by allowing speech therapist to interpret communication
of hearing impaired illiterate witness who could read lips when defendant was
acquitted on counts in which the witness was the prosecution's main witness);
Burgess v. State, 53 So. 2d 568 (Ala. 1951)(hearing and speech impaired witness
allowed to testify through her brother by means "which time and necessity had
invented between them"); Commonwealth v. Clark, 52 Pa. D. & C. 189 (1944)(in-
terpreter allowed to testify for witness who did not know sign language when she
1995]
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First, translators of idiosyncratic communication must demon-
strate they are qualified. One factor courts look to in determining
qualification is whether an interpreter has communicated with the
witness long enough to give the interpreter sufficient particular
knowledge about the witness' manner of communication.8 4 For exam-
ple, in Minor v. State,85 the cousin of a disabled witness was permitted
to translate hand signals because the two had been communicating for
several years.8 6 Similarly, in United States v. Ball,87 the court found
the wife of a hearing impaired witness qualified as an interpreter be-
cause their long relationship allowed them to understand each
other.88
Another factor courts examine is whether the translator is actually
interpreting a language or merely relating vague impressions from the
witness. In Watson v. State,89 the witness was unable to speak be-
cause of a stroke and could only say "uh-huh." Throughout his testi-
mony he gave contradictory answers and the court was frequently
unable to determine whether the witness meant "yes" or "no." The
interpreter had been taking care of the witness for six months, and in
explaining how she understood the witness, said: "[IHie puts quite a
bit of emphasis on his yes answers and he will bow to you usually.
And if he is saying no he usually grabs you. That means to halt, and
then he will explain whatever he is trying to tell you over."90 She ex-
plained that they "did not talk as such but could 'communicate.'"91
The appellate court held there was no evidence that this person was
qualified to act as an interpreter. The court reasoned the trial court
not only failed to specify how the witness was competent, it failed to
made motions understandable to him); Almon v. State, 109 So. 371 (Ala. Ct. App.
1926)(mother of complaining witness with unique speech impediment allowed to
interpret); Skaggs v. State, 8 N.E. 695 (Ind. 1886)(interpreter who was not "ad-
ept" at sign language but who could "well and truly interpret" for the particular
witness was permitted to interpret).
84. See State v. Weldon, 17 S.E. 688 (S.C. 1893)(testimony of hearing and speech
impaired witness through interpreters admissible when the witness had worked
for the interpreters before and they testified that he was intelligent and that they
had very little difficulty communicating with him by signs).
85. 659 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
86. Id. at 164. The court noted that the witness was otherwise competent in that he
was able to understand questions and had no mental disabilities.
87. 988 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1993).
88. The court analyzed the use of such an interpreter under Federal Rules of Evi-
dence Rules 604 & 702. Id. at 9.
89. 596 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).




properly say why the interpreter was uniquely qualified to translate
for the witness.92
Another reason for disqualifying the interpreter mentioned by the
Watson court, though not articulated by other courts, is the fact that
there was no means to independently verify the accuracy of the idio-
syncratic translation.9 3 Thus, the court recognized what other courts
may assume but few state: the interpretation must be capable of be-
ing objectively tested to determine if communication is occurring.94
Courts assess qualifications primarily by requiring the translator
to provide sound reasons why she or he is qualified. 95 The person's
qualifications are tested through the traditional means of direct and
cross-examination.
On rare occasions courts may elicit independent testimony from
other witnesses about the qualifications of the interpreter. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Addonizio,9S a dying man was unable to speak
above a loud mumble, and the court allowed his wife to interpret for
him. The court questioned the wife and also accepted the testimony of
the witness' physician that the wife had been with her husband con-
stantly during his illness and had demonstrated an ability to interpret
accurately.97
The second requirement for interpreters of idiosyncratic communi-
cation is that they be sworn.9 8 As early as 1786, English courts held
interpretation of idiosyncratic sign language admissible as long as the
interpreter was sworn. In John Ruston's Case,99 a speech-impaired
witness was able to communicate with his sister through signs that
"were not significant of letters, syllables, words, or sentences, but were
expressive of general propositions, and entire conceptions of the
92. Id. at 871-72. See also People v. Bustos, 51 Philippine Rep. 385 (1928)(finding a
teacher of the hearing and speech impaired unqualified because she did not have
sufficient contact with the witness to be able to understand her signs).
93. As the Watson court stated: "[Tihere would be no conceivable manner in which
the interpreter's 'translation' could be tested for obviously there was no one else
available to act as an intermediary in that regard." Watson v. State, 596 S.W.2d
867, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
94. Courts do not uniformly require objective testing of the translation. See WRGmHT
& GoLD, supra note 69, § 6055, at 320-21. Only in the unusual case such as Wat-
son where a person's ability to translate is put into question has the issue arisen.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Ball, 988 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1993)(parties given the oppor-
tunity to question wife concerning her abilities to interpret for her husband);
United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936
(1972)(court examined translator and other witnesses concerning translator's
abilities); Burgess v. State, 53 So. 2d 568 (Ala. 1951)(translator examined on voir
dire concerning his ability to translate).
96. 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971).
97. Id. at 68.
98. See FED. R. Evm. 604. See also Skaggs v. State, 8 N.E. 695, 697 (Ind. 1886).
99. 1 Leach Cr. L. 408, 168 Eng. Rep. 306 (1786).
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mind."00 The witness was sworn to tell the truth, the interpreter was
sworn "well and truly to interpret,".o and the evidence was deemed
properly admitted. Likewise, the sworn testimony of an interpreter of
idiosyncratic communication has been accepted in the United
States.1O2
Finally, interpreters of idiosyncratic communication must meet the
requirement of impartiality, although in almost all cases the inter-
preter is a close friend or relative.OS The impartiality rule requires
the appointment of "[t]he most competent least biased person."1o 4 For
example, in United States v. Balllo5 the defendant failed to show the
wife's bias threatened the fairness of the proceedings. The Court of
Appeals held that the trial judge must consider the circumstances of
each case, including the "interpreter's interest and involvement in the
case, the necessity of having a family member act as an interpreter,
and available alternative modes of testimony.lO6
In contrast, the court in Prince v. Beto,107 found reversible error
when a husband was allowed to testify for his hearing and speech-
impaired wife when other interpreters were available, the husband
had offered to not cooperate if he was paid one hundred dollars, there
was evidence he lied about other facts, and it was difficult to elicit a
correct interpretation.
A unique variation of idiosyncratic communication cases are those
in which a witness is unable or unwilling to speak aloud at trial and
instead whispers or mumbles testimony to another who then speaks it
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Skaggs v. State, 8 N.E. 695, 697 (Ind. 1886). See Zitter, supra note 44, § 8.
103. See Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Disqualification, for Bias, of One Offered as
Interpreter of Testimony, 6 A.L.R. 4th 158, 170-72, § 5b (1981). In Territory v.
Duran, 3 P. 53 (N.M. 1884), a nine-year-old hearing and speech impaired child
witnessed a murder. The child had not learned standardized sign language, so
the mother interpreted the child's idiosyncratic signs. In attempting to assess
the competency of the child, the mother was unable to get the child to respond to
questions asked to assess his competency; he only wanted to tell the events he
witnessed. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that allowing the testimony
was improper when the child's competency was not established. Id. at 54-55. See
Fairbanks v. Cowan, 551 F.2d 97 (1977)(not error to allow father to act as inter-
preter for son who was victim of sodomy even though father was outwardly emo-
tional during trial).
104. State v. Givens, 719 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)(half-brother of witness
whose damaged vocal cords made her voice nearly inaudible allowed to interpret
while under oath).
105. 988 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1993).
106. Id. at 10. Similarly, the Texas Court of Appeals stated: "Although the use of a
partisan interpreter should be avoided, the appointment of an interpreter is a
matter to be left to the trial court, and absent a showing of abuse of such discre-
tion, such judgment will not be disturbed on appeal." Minor v. State, 659 S.W.2d
161, 164 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)(citation omitted).
107. 426 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1970).
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aloud.108 Courts examine interpreters for whispering witnesses as
they do interpreters of other idiosyncratic forms of communication.' 0 9
Since there are normally no qualifications of an interpreter to as-
sess,11 0 however, courts look only to whether the interpreter is
sworn 1 1 and impartiall12 and consider these two safeguards as ade-
quate protection against unreliable testimony.
108. See People v. Miller, 530 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (Crim. Ct. 1988)(52-year-old victim
who had cerebral palsy and communicated in mumbles allowed to testify with the
assistance of a speech therapist who testified she would give a literal transmis-
sion of the witness' statements and that "[she would neither alter the meaning or
syntax of his answers nor fill in words for the witness"); In re R.R., 398 A.2d 76
(N.J. 1979)(mother allowed to interpret for four-year-old sexual abuse victim who
occasionally used gestures and incomprehensible speech); United States v. Ad-
donizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972)(no error for
trial court to allow witness' wife to interpret for witness who was unable to speak
above a loud mumble); Trial of Charles Lord Mohun, 12 A CoNIxTE CoLLECoN
OF STATE T~uLs 949, 990 (T. B. Howell ed., 1812) (1691)(court clerk repeated
answers of a young witness who could not speak loud enough for the judge to
hear).
109. In United States v. Romey, 32 M.J. 180 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 924
(1991), an eight-year-old sexual abuse victim whispered responses to her mother.
The trial judge swore the mother as an interpreter and instructed her to repeat
precisely what the child said without any additional words. The defendant ar-
gued that this procedure denied him the right to confront his accuser and that it
prevented him from receiving a fair trial because the mother's bias made the tes-
timony unreliable. Id. at 183. The court held the interpreter's bias did not make
the testimony unreliable for five reasons. First, the mother was not an eyewit-
ness and did not provide substantive evidence for the government. Second, there
was no evidence she "engaged in any extortious conduct" toward the defendant.
Third, defendant did not challenge the accuracy of the mother's interpretation at
trial. Fourth, she took an oath analogous to that of an interpreter. Fifth, the
mother's testimony was largely cumulative of what the child ultimately testified
to on her own. Id. at 183-84. The court broadly held: "We find no unreliability or
true unavailability for cross-examination or denial of due process in this context."
Id. at 184.
110. Qualification of the interpreter only arises in whispering cases when the witness'
speech is difficult to understand and too quiet to hear. Such cases are discussed
supra under idiosyncratic methods of communicating. The qualification require-
ment is omitted only in those cases in which there is no speech impairment other
than speaking too softly to be heard in court. For a discussion of cases in which
child witnesses require an interpreter to relay their whispered testimony, see 1
MYeRs, supra note 50, § 2.13, at 88-93.
111. In State v. Leavitt, 758 P.2d 982 (Wash. 1988)(en banc), a six-year-old victim
answered twelve of the prosecutor's questions at a competency hearing by whis-
pering the answers to a social worker who repeated them to the court. The court
swore the social worker to repeat the child's answers "truly and accurately."
There was no reversible error in this procedure. Id. at 983-84. In State v. Wells,
230 S.E.2d 437 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976), it is not clear whether the translator was
even put under oath. A nine-year-old victim whispered answers to questions of a
"very personal nature" to the court reporter who repeated them to the jury. On
appeal, the court refused to reverse because defense counsel failed to object to
this procedure at trial. Id. at 438.
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C. Burdens of Proof
1. Proving Competency of a Witness
Courts in jurisdictions with a presumption of competency assess
witness competency only when it is factually challenged by the oppo-
nent of the testimony, thereby eliminating the requirement of a com-
petency hearing each time a child or a disabled witness testifies.113
The rule enunciated in State v. Hussey,114 typifies the position of
courts applying the presumption of competency:
To disqualify a child witness from testifying, the presiding justice must make
a specific finding that either the proposed witness is incapable of expressing
himself concerning the matter so as to be understood by the judge and jury, or
the proposed witness is incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to
tell the truth.1
1 5
A witness' incompetence may be proven through the testimony of
another person who has personal experience with the witness.116 Cit-
ing a disability alone is not sufficient to rebut a presumption of compe-
tency;11 7 the opponent must present specific evidence why the
particular witness is not competent.1 's
If the opponent presents some evidence of the witness' incapacity,
a competency hearing may be heldl19 to provide the opponent an op-
112. See United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 68 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 936 (1972).
113. See State v. Superior Court, 719 P.2d 283 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Ingram v. State,
463 N.E.2d 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)(stating that trial court has no duty to con-
duct competency hearing until a party puts the matter in issue). See also 1 My-
ERs, supra note 50, § 2.3, at 68-70; 2 Wigmore, supra note 42, § 506, at 712.
114. 521 A.2d 278 (Me. 1987).
115. Id. at 280. Similarly, the Arizona Court of Appeals held:
In instances of extreme youth, to find a lack of competency, the judge
must be convinced that no trier of fact could reasonably believe that the
prospective witness could have observed, communicated, remembered or
told the truth with respect to the event in question.
State v. Superior Court, 719 P.2d 283,287 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). For a list of ages
at which courts have deemed children competent to testify, see Uehlein, supra
note 60, §§ 30-44.
116. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 485, at 642-43.
117. KIey v. Abell, 483 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
118. In rare instances, children and witnesses whose mental capacity is challenged
are required to submit to independent psychological examinations. The expert
who examined the witness then testifies as to the competence of the witness
based on the examination. See United States v. Pacelli, 521 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976); State v. Butler, 160 A2d 8 (N.J. 1960).
However, such an examination is looked upon as the exception rather than the
rule. 1 MYERs, supra note 50, § 2.22, at 134. Psychologists are no more qualified
to determine a child's competency than a judge.
119. Some courts have held that the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing to deter-
mine the competency of a witness who communicates through idiosyncratic meth-




portunity to demonstrate that the witness is not communicating. 120
At this hearing, both the opponent and proponent have the opportu-
nity to present evidence, but the burden is on the opponent to over-
come the presumption of competence. 12 1
In some jurisdictions, the burden of proving competence shifts to
the proponent after the opponent makes a prima facie showing of in-
competence.122 Guidance as to which party bears the burden of proof
is not provided by all courts:
What is sufficient in order that the offering party may be put to the necessity
of adducing evidence of capacity, and the judge to the necessity of determining
the existence of capacity, has not been made entirely clear by decisions. It
may be supposed that a mere objection raised and a claim to have a voir dire
examination would suffice. Moreover, the offering of any extrinsic evidence
whatever would suffice to make it necessary for the judge to record a similar
finding.123
More frequent, however, are those states requiring the opponent to do
more than merely raise an objection to the competency of a witness;
the opponent must affirmatively establish the incompetence of a
witness.124
2. Proving Qualifications of an Interpreter
Courts decide the need for an interpreter on a case-by-case ba-
sis,125 and a court may hold a hearing to assess qualifications of a
proffered interpreter.1 26 The hearing need not be conducted in the
presence of the jury, and it should be limited to matters unrelated to
the substance of the case.1 27 The opponent bears the burdenl28 of
proving through direct or cross-examination, or by independent testi-
120. 2 WiGoRE, supra note 42, § 484, at 641-42.
121. See, e.g., Holloway v. State, 849 S.W.2d 473,477 (Ark. 1993)("[t]he burden of per-
suasion is upon the party alleging that the potential witness is incompetent").
See also McComcx, supra note 49, § 70, at 168 n.2.
122. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 497, at 703.
123. See 2 WiMoRE, supra note 42, § 497, at 703.
124. See cases cited in 1 MYERs, supra note 50, at 117 n.298.
125. See Burgess v. State, 53 So. 2d 568 (Ala. 1951); Todd v. State, 380 So. 2d 370 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1980); Dobbins v. Little Rock R.R. & Elec. Co., 95 S.W. 794 (Ark.
1906); People v. Vandiver, 468 N.E.2d 454 (111. App. Ct. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Clark, 52 Pa. D. & C. 189 (1944). In some situations, such as when a witness is
able to receive and respond to questions in writing, a translator may not be re-
quired. Ritchey v. People, 47 P. 272 (Colo. 1896)(hearing and speech impaired
witness examined through written questions and answers). Some courts require
the testimony of witnesses who are able to write to be taken in writing rather
than through an interpreter. Cf Morrison v. Lennard, 3 Car. & P. 127, 172 Eng.
Rep. 354 (1827)(allowing translated testimony even though witness could write).
For a discussion of the use of writing instead of signed interpretation, see cases
cited in Zitter, supra note 44, § 5.
126. State v. Van Pham, 675 P.2d 848, 856 (Kan. 1984). See also 21 C.J.S. Courts
§ 110 (1990).
127. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 69, § 6054, at 314.
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mony129 that the translation is inaccurate or the interpreter is
unqualified.130
D. Summary of Cases Involving Third Party Interpreters
Because witnesses must have the capacity to communicate in order
to be competent to testify, the testimony of a witness who is unable to
communicate independently may be subject to scrutiny. However, the
presumption of competence applies to such a witness and the oppo-
nent of the testimony bears the burden of proving the incompetence of
the witness.
A hearing may be held to determine whether the witness is actu-
ally communicating. Because such witnesses require the assistance of
another to communicate, the third party assistant often is the focus of
the inquiry. Each case is examined on its own facts and courts deter-
mine whether the interpreter is qualified and unbiased. The inter-
preter is then sworn and allowed to interpret.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY FROM WITNESSES
WHOSE IN-COURT TESTIMONY IS AFFECTED BY
OUT-OF-COURT PROCEDURES
The law governing the admission of translated testimony is well
settled. Facilitated communication, however, poses a unique legal is-
sue: when scientific or pseudo-scientific out-of-court procedures are
applied in a way that may arguably affect the substance of a person's
in-court testimony, is the admissibility of the testimony contingent
upon whether the out-of-court procedures are generally accepted in
the scientific community? Courts differ greatly in their responses to
this question, with most of the relevant precedent arising in the con-
text of hypnotically affected testimony. 131
128. An opponent may waive or forfeit the right to challenge an interpreter's qualifica-
tions by failing to object at trial. See Hicks v. State, 713 P.2d 18 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1986)(defendant waived right to challenge trial court's failure to swear or
qualify interpreter for nine-year-old hearing and speech impaired child).
129. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 110 (1990).
130. 27 WPiGHT & GOLD, supra note 69, § 6055, at 321.
131. Experts routinely apply accumulated scientific knowledge to evidence adduced at
trial. For example, DNA evidence is analyzed out-of-court and the interpretation
is given in-court based on the expert's scientific knowledge; radar clocking takes
place out-of-court and the officer testifies about the clocking and working of the
radar in court. However, there are few other situations in which a procedure that
could be labelled scientific is itself the lay testimony. Thus, the most analogous
precedent is that involving an out-of-court scientific procedure-hypnosis-that
arguably affects the lay witness' in-court testimony.
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A large body of case law addresses the admissibility of in-court tes-
timony of witnesses who underwent hypnosis prior to trial.13 2 Hypno-
sis was adopted as an investigative technique for law enforcement in
the 1970s to assist witnesses in remembering details surrounding a
crime. 33 Hypnosis has also been used by criminal defendants to re-
fresh their memories of crimes they are accused of committing.134 The
effectiveness of hypnosis as a therapeutic tool is well accepted,'35 but
it remains a controversial investigative tecbnique.13 6
Courts differ as to how the debate over hypnosis within the scien-
tific community impacts the admissibility of in-court testimony based
on hypnotically affected memories. One approach applies the rule
enumerated in Frye v. United States,137 and holds hypnotically af-
fected testimony per se inadmissible because it is not generally ac-
cepted in the scientific community as producing reliable memories. 138
A second approach allows hypnotically affected testimony only if enu-
merated safeguards are present when the hypnosis occurs.139 A third
approach declines to apply Frye to this testimony.140 Before discuss-
ing these approaches, however, it is first necessary to review the Frye
opinion and its progeny.
132. For a summary of the case law, see Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibil-
ity of Hypnotically Refreshed or Enhanced Testimony, 77 A.L.R. 4th 927 (1990).
133. Michael J. Beaudine, Comment, Growing Disenchantment with Hypnotic Means
of Refreshing Witness Recall, 41 VAND. L. REV. 379 (1988). See Michael S. Serrill,
Breaking the Spell of Hypnosis, TziE, Sept. 17, 1984, at 62; The Svengali Squad,
TiEr, Sept. 13, 1976, at 56.
134. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987)(holding that a per se rule of inadmissi-
bility for all hypnotically affected testimony unconstitutionally prohibited a crim-
inal defendant from testifying on her own behalf).
135. Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials, 45 VANi.
L. REV. 1185, 1221-38 (1992)(reviewing psychiatric and psychological literature
concerning the reliability of memories of childhood sexual abuse recalled while
undergoing therapeutic hypnosis and arguing that hypnosis should not render
the witness incompetent to testify in civil proceedings).
136. Roy UDOLF, FoRENsic HYPNosIs: PsYcHoLOGIcAL AND LEGAL AsPEcTs (1983). See
Biskup v. McCaughtry, 20 F.3d 245, 253-55 (7th Cir. 1994)(reviewing hypnosis
case law and holding that admission of a hypnotically affected statement does not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
137. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 166-73.
139. See infra text accompanying notes 163-65.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 174-89. Some courts carve out a fourth ap-
proach, a "totality of the circumstances" test. See People v. Romero, 745 P.2d
1003 (Colo. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 990 (1988); Zani v. State, 767 S.W.2d 825
(Tex. Ct. App. 1989). For purposes of this Article, no attempt was made to distin-
guish these cases from the second class of cases.
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A. Frye v. United States
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Frye v. United
States141 held inadmissible the testimony of an expert witness as to
the results of an early version of a polygraph test conducted on a crim-
inal defendant. 142 In one paragraph the court crafted a holding that
has been quoted extensively by courts ever since:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
14 3
The Frye opinion established the principle that before expert testi-
mony based on novel scientific discoveries is admissible, a court must
find that the science is generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community.
Courts in subsequent cases have explained why a test such as Frye
is necessary for analyzing novel scientific evidence.144 First, a Frye
test ensures reliable scientific evidence will be presented to the jury by
creating an extremely cautious standard, whereby only well-tested ev-
idence is admissible.145 Second, the consistency and uniformity is
provided by creating a bright-line rule for each category of scientific
evidence.346 In a particular jurisdiction, everyone will know that, as-
suming proper performance of the procedure, information produced by
alcohol breatholizers and radar guns is admissible, while the results of
141. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
142. Id. at 1014.
143. Id.
144. For discussion and analysis of these cases, see 1 PAUL C. GIANNELm & EDwARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, ScIENTIFic EVIDENCE § 1-5(A) to -5(E) (2d ed. 1993); Paul C. Gian-
nelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 CoLum. L. Rlv. 1197 (1980); David McCord, Expert Psy-
chological Testimony about Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A
Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CnmM. L. &
CRnvmnOLoGY 1 (1986); David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Ex-
otica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evi-
dence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REv. 19 (1987); J. Ken Thompson, Note, A
Review of the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc.
741 (1994).
145. See State v. Mena, 624 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Ariz. 1981); John E.B. Myers, Expert
Testimony Describing Psychological Syndromes, 24 PAc. L.J. 1449 (1993)(criticiz-
ing the proliferation of pseudo-scientific syndrome testimony in child sexual
abuse cases). Myers argues elsewhere that, due primarily to inadequacies in the
abilities of attorneys to cross-examine experts about novel scientific evidence, the
courtroom is not the place to assess such evidence. Rather, the scientific commu-
nity should debate the issue before the evidence enters the courtroom. Myers,
supra note 14, at 506-07.
146. See, e.g., Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 135 (Alaska 1986).
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polygraphs and hypnosis are inadmissible. Third, a rule of per se ex-
clusion is necessary because evidence cloaked as science is given great
weight by juries and therefore should be admitted only if widely ac-
cepted by scientists as reliable.' 47 Fourth, techniques not highly re-
garded among scientists may nonetheless become a major distraction
at trial if admitted.148 Fifth, a Frye test ensures that a well defined
group of experts is available to testify on the issue.1 4 9 As a general
rule, then, Frye is seen as a conservative test precluding admission of
inadequately tested novel scientific evidence.15o
B. Courts Applying a Frye Test to Hypnotically Affected
Testimony
Most courts initially analyzed hypnotically affected testimony as
an issue relating to the credibility of witnesses, and not as scientific
testimony.151 The New Jersey Supreme Court explained the then-
prevailing view:
These cases have generally reasoned that testimony of a witness whose mem-
ory has been revived through hypnosis should be treated like any other pres-
ent recollection refreshed. That the witness' memory may have been impaired
by hypnosis or that suggestive materials may have been used to refresh his
recollection is considered to be a matter affecting credibility, not admissibility.
It is assumed that skillful cross-examination will enable the jury to evaluate
the effect of hypnosis on the witness and the credibility of his testimony.15 2
In the early 1980s, however, many courts rejected a case-by-case
analysis of hypnotically affected testimony and a majority now ex-
147. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
148. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72 (Md. 1978).
149. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
150. See infra note 182 for a discussion of tests other than Frye governing the admis-
sion of novel scientific evidence.
151. The seminal decision holding that hypnosis affects only the witness' credibility
was Harding v. State, 246 A.2d 302 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 949 (1969). See also United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979)(holding that hypnosis goes to credibility, not
admissibility); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977)(ana-
lyzing constitutional implications of suggestive eyewitness identifications and
finding that hypnosis did not create a "very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification" in this case)(quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 384
(1968)); Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)(analyzing hypnot-
ically affected testimony as a present recollection with hypnosis going to the wit-
ness' credibility); People v. Smrekar, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979)(holding hypnotically affected testimony admissible when the hypnotist was
shown to be competent, suggestion was not used, the identification was substan-
tially corroborated, and the witness had ample time to view the defendant at the
time of the crime); State v. McQueen, 244 S.E.2d 414,427-29 (N.C. 1978)(analyz-
ing hypnotically affected testimony as a present recollection with hypnosis going
to credibility); State v. Jorgensen, 492 P.2d 312 (Or. 1971)(holding that hypnosis
goes to weight, not admissibility, of testimony).
152. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 1981)(citations omitted).
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amine it as scientific testimony.153 These courts state that the ration-
ale of Frye applies equally to "evidence which appears scientific and is
especially likely to be accepted and believed,"154 and enunciate sev-
eral reasons justifying its application to hypnotically affected
testimony.
In what is recognized as one of the leading cases,155 the New
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd156 discussed the rationale be-
hind applying Frye to hypnotically affected testimony:
Like the results of a polygraph examination or voiceprint analysis, the credi-
bility of recall stimulated by hypnosis depends upon the reliability of the sci-
entific procedure used. If the procedure is not capable of yielding reasonably
reliable results, then its probative value may be outweighed by the risks en-
tailed in its use in a criminal trial. These risks include prejudice, jury confu-
sion, and consumption of time and trial resources. 157
The court then identified three reasons why hypnosis is not gener-
ally accepted as an accurate method of recalling memories. First, a
hypnotized person is highly vulnerable to suggestion:Ss answers may
be shaped by questions and other subtle cues. Second, a person who
has been hypnotized may not be able to critically evaluate the hypnoti-
cally refreshed memories.159 Especially if an authority figure such as
a police officer is present during the hypnosis, the person may be will-
ing to accept information uncritically while hypnotized.160 Third, a
person who has been hypnotized may lose the ability to distinguish
pre- and post-hypnosis memories.'61 Memories recalled under hypno-
sis may be combined with memories recalled before hypnosis such that
neither the expert nor the person hypnotized may be able to segregate
what has been affected by hypnosis.162
Despite finding Frye applicable, the Hurd court severely limited its
application. Instead of requiring that hypnosis produce "historically
153. See Beaudine, supra note 133, at 386-87. The first exclusion of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony based on Frye occurred in State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764
(Minn. 1980), followed by People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d 775 (Cal.)(en banc), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982), which firmly established a per se inadmissibility
approach based on Frye. See Beaudine, supra note 133, at 400.
154. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 135 (Alaska 1986).
155. Hurd was not the first court to apply a scientific evidence standard to hypnoti-
cally affected testimony. See State v. Mena, 624 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1981); State v.
Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980). However, the Hurd opinion sparked a ma-
jor change in approach toward such cases that has been followed by numerous
other jurisdictions. See Gary M. Shaw, The Admissibility of Hypnotically En-
hanced Testimony in Criminal Trials, 75 MARQ. L. Rav. 1, 25-33 (1991).
156. 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981).
157. Id. at 91-92 (citation omitted).







accurate" testimony, the court said it only needs to be determined
whether hypnosis "is able to yield recollections as accurate as those of
an ordinary witness, which likewise are often historically inaccu-
rate."'163 The court held that, to show an acceptable level of reliability,
the proponent of hypnotically affected testimony must establish the
existence of certain safeguards. Safeguards include using an in-
dependent and professional hypnotist, recording information known to
the witness before hypnosis, recording the hypnosis session itself, and
precluding outsiders such as police investigators from attending the
hypnosis session.164 Many courts have followed the procedural re-
quirements delineated in Hurd.165
Following Hurd, many courts began excluding all hypnotically af-
fected testimony regardless of whether Hurd's procedural safeguards
had been followed.166 In a decision that has since been adhered to by
many other courts,167 the Alaska Supreme Court in Contreras v.
StatelsS examined whether identification of defendants is per se
tainted when victims are placed under hypnosis to reconstruct memo-
ries of their assailant. The government urged the court not to apply a
Frye test to hypnotically affected testimony, arguing that if all lay tes-
timony were subjected to a Frye test, most of it would be deemed inad-
missible due to the large amount of scientific literature finding
eyewitness testimony as a whole unreliable. The court dismissed this
argument, finding that hypnosis changes the witness' memory and de-
meanor in ways that non-hypnotic memory refreshing devices do
not.169 Not only does this hinder effective cross-examination, rea-
163. Id. at 92.
164. Id. at 96-97.
165. See People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003 1016-17 (Colo. 1987); State v. Iwakiri, 682
P.2d 571, 578-79 (Idaho 1984); State v. Butterworth, 792 P.2d 1049, 1058 (Kan.
1990); House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 824-26 (Miss. 1984); State v. Beachum, 643
P.2d 246, 253-54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618, 623-24
(S.D. 1988); State v. Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394-96 (Wis. 1983).
166. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266 (Ariz. 1982); State v.
Mena, 624 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1981); People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982); State v. Atwood, 479 A.2d 258 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); State v. Davis,
490 A.2d 601 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986); State v. Moreno, 709 P.2d 103 (Haw. 1985); Peterson
v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1983); State v. Haislip, 701 P.2d 909 (Kan.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); State v. Collins, 464 A.2d 1028 (Md. 1983); Com-
monwealth v. Kater, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (Mass. 1983); People v. Gonzales, 329
N.W.2d 743 (Mich. 1982); Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985); State v.
Palmer, 313 N.W.2d 648 (Neb. 1981); People v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y.
1983); Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1246 (1984); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d 170 (Pa. 1981); State v.
Martin, 684 P.2d 651 (Wash. 1984).
167. See People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513 (IM. 1989); Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775
(Ind. 1988).




soned the court, it also creates a false impression for the jury to
assess.
170
The court held Frye applicable to hypnotically affected testimony,
stating "lay testimony that is dependent upon hypnosis cannot be logi-
cally dissociated from the underlying scientific technique."171 The
court held that a Frye test provides a manageable standard, is judi-
cially economical, guards against juries placing too much weight on
scientific evidence whose validity has not been accepted by the scien-
tific community, and ensures uniformity of decision-making.1 72 The
court went on to rule that under a Frye standard, any memory recalled
is per se inadmissible.17s
C. Courts Holding Frye Inapplicable to Hypnotically
Affected Testimony
A few courts reject the premise that Frye applies to hypnotically
affected testimony.1 74 These courts adhere to the earlier view that the
170. Id.
171. Id. at 134. The Minnesota Supreme Court expressed similar reasoning.
Although hypnotically-adduced 'memory' is not strictly analogous to the
results of mechanical testing, we are persuaded that the Frye rule is
equally applicable in this context, where the best expert testimony indi-
cates that no expert can determine whether memory retrieved by hypno-
sis, or any part of that memory, is truth, falsehood, or confabulation-a
filling of gaps with fantasy. Such results are not scientifically reliable as
accurate.
State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
172. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 134 (Alaska 1986). The Contreras court stated:
If hypnotically adduced testimony were to be admitted, the jury would
have to decide the question of the credibility of the witness. However,
this determination would be predicated upon the jury's understanding of
the scientific underpinnings of the methods by which the testimony was
developed. The way a jury would evaluate such testimony is closely
analogous to the way it would evaluate evidence developed from poly-
graph testing.
Id. at 135.
173. Although at least one court has ruled that using a hypnotic procedure excludes
all testimony by the hypnotized witness about the subject of the hypnosis, People
v. Shirley, 641 P.2d 775 (Cal.)(en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982), most
courts adhering to a rule of per se inadmissibility nonetheless allow a person who
has been hypnotized to testify as to events recalled before the hypnosis session.
See cases listed in McGlauflin v. State, 857 P.2d 366, 371-72 (Alaska Ct. App.
1993)(hypnotically affected testimony admissible when hypnosis was not con-
ducted for the purpose of eliciting facts about the crime and there was very little
discussion of the crime during the session), and in Hall v. Commonwealth, 403
S.E.2d 362, 370 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). Consequently, only memories affected by the
hypnosis are excluded per se in these jurisdictions. See id. The proponent of the
testimony has the burden of proving the testimony was recalled prior to the hyp-
nosis. Id.
174. See Clay v. Vose, 771 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Waksal, 539 F.
Supp. 834 (S.D. Fla. 1982); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983); State v.
Little, 674 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 1984)(en banc), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029 (1985);
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fact that a witness has been hypnotized goes only to the weight, not
the admissibility, of the testimony. The North Dakota Supreme Court
in State v. Brown175 was one of the first state supreme courts to ex-
plicitly reject a Frye test in the context of a hypnotized witness, hold-
ing that admissibility of such testimony should be analyzed as an
issue of competence.l7 6 According to this view, once a witness is found
competent, any subsequent attack goes to the credibility of the hypno-
tized witness rather than to the scientific nature of the hypnosis it-
self.177 The court in Brown reasoned that a per se exclusion of
testimony unfairly prohibits a crime victim from testifying in any
form.17s Rather, the proper method for determining the worth of hyp-
notically affected testimony is through cross-examination:
If we were to apply to all witnesses the concern with suggestibility and diffi-
culty of cross-examination which is exhibited in the decisions from the juris-
dictions which have adopted the per se inadmissibility rule in regard to
hypnotically induced testimony, "we would not allow a lawyer to talk to his
witnesses before trial, we would exclude most identification testimony, and
relatives and friends of a party could be excluded as witnesses."
1 7 9
The court also recognized potential criticisms of its approach and ac-
cepted the implications:
Should our decision result in exposing the jury in each case to the testimony of
expert witnesses as to the reliability and uses of hypnosis as an investigative
tool, so be it. We believe this alternative is preferable to the potential exclu-
sion of relevant testimonial evidence and the end of hypnosis as an investiga-
tive tool in this jurisdiction.... We are firmly of the belief that jurors are
"quite capable of seeing through flaky testimony" and pseudo-scientific "clap-
trap. 1 8 0
State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386 (Wis. 1983); Chap-
man v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
175. 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983).
176. Id. at 151.
177. Id. See also Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 89-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cited
by the North Dakota court for the proposition that Frye is inapplicable to eyewit-
ness testimony.
178. State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 149 (N.D. 1983).
179. Id. at 151 (quoting dissenting opinion from State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court,
644 P.2d 1266, 1277 (Ariz. 1982)(Holohan, C.J., dissenting)).
180. State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 151-52 (N.D. 1983)(quoting People v. Williams,
183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (Ct. App. 1982)(Gardner, J. concurring)). The court in
State v. Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386 (Wis. 1983), also discussed the problem of
applying Frye to in-court eyewitness testimony:
It is not the reliability of hypnosis to put one in a hypnotic trance that
is at issue when the witness testifies. It is the reliability of a specific
human memory as affected by hypnosis that must be examined. There
are no experts who can testify as to what specific effects hypnosis has
had on the witness! memory; just as there are no experts who can testify
that a normal waking memory of an event is in fact a completely accu-
rate representation of what actually occurred. The most a trial judge
can do is review the hypnotic session to ensure that no impermissible
suggestiveness has occurred. However, in such a review, it is not the
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A variation of the Brown approach is expressed by courts declining
to apply Frye, yet continuing to closely scrutinize the procedures sur-
rounding the hypnosis of a witness. Prominent among these are fed-
eral courts that rely on Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702181 in
analyzing the admissibility of novel scientific evidence under a rele-
vancy test rather than under a Frye test. This analysis balances the
probative value of hypnotically affected testimony against its possible
prejudicial effect.182 While general acceptance is one indicator of reli-
ability, additional factors are weighed in determining admissibility.183
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for example, held Frye
inapplicable to hypnotically affected testimony in United States v.
Valdez.18 4 The court stated:
The "Frye test"... applies in terms to the admissibility of expert opinion and
experimental data. The issue here is not the admissibility of a hypnotist's
observations or statements made by the witness during hypnosis but instead
the admissibility of the testimony of a lay witness in a normal, waking
state.... Our evaluation instead considers three basic evidentiary precepts:
first, the principle embodied in Federal Rules 402 and 601 that "all relevant
evidence is admissible" and "every person is competent to be a witness," sub-
ject only to certain explicit exceptions; second, the jurisprudential rule that, in
determining admissibility, the trial judge's discretion is wide (a rule based on
the superior opportunity for insight available to trial judges); and finally, the
limiting rule that even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by such factors as "the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."185
In a footnote, the court made its view of Frye and hypnosis very
clear: "[We] decline to apply a test designed for pseudo-scientific data
reliability of hypnosis that is to be examined. Rather, it is the effect of a
specific hypnotic session that is to be determined.
Id. at 393.
181. Rule 702 allows the admission of expert testimony so long as it 'assists the trier
of fact." FED. R. Evm. 702.
182. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1984). See also 1 MY-
ERS, supra note 50, § 4.19, at 266-67. Some courts treat a Frye test and a rele-
vance test as essentially the same. For example, in State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86
(N.J. 1981), the court held'that a general acceptance test applies to hypnotically
affected testimony and used a relevance analysis as part of the justification for
applying Frye. See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text. Similarly, Con-
treras v. State is based on a relevancy balancing test under the state equivalent to
Rule 403. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 136-38 (Alaska 1986). As evidenced
by both Hurd and Contreras, however, courts adopting a relevance test do not
necessarily apply the test case-by-case. For the purposes of this Article, these
courts are grouped together under the first approach discussed infra at text ac-
companying notes 151-73, and only those courts adopting a case-by-case rele-
vancy analysis are discussed in this section. See Shaw, supra note 155, at 21-24,
for a comparison and contrast of the varying approaches.
183. See 1 MYERs, supra note 50, § 4.19, at 266-67, for a summary of the factors courts
use when applying a relevancy test to novel scientific evidence generally.
184. 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984)(citing FED. R. Evm. 403).
185. Id. at 1200-01 (footnotes omitted).
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in a manner that would render a lay witness incompetent to give pre-
viously admissible testimony."'8 6 Rather than create a per se rule of
inadmissibility in all cases,18 7 the court required an examination of
the facts of each case to determine whether adequate procedures88
were followed to ensure reliability.1s 9
D. Constitutional Issues
Regardless of whether courts adopt a Frye test, constitutional con-
cerns play a significant role in many decisions precluding hypnotically
affected testimony.190 The court in Contreras noted that the effect of
hypnosis on a witness' demeanor-giving the witness extreme confi-
dence in the memory-can impair cross-examination to the point that
it violates a defendant's right of confrontation.191
Similarly, witnesses who are hypnotized by police for purposes of
identifying assailants may be so inclined to help the police that they
are "hypersuggestible" to whatever the police want or expect to
find.3t92 Consequently, a defendant's due process rights may be jeop-
ardized by eyewitness identifications made under hypnosis.193
Yet another constitutional argument is that an identification made
by a witness for the first time while under hypnosis violates a defend-
186. Id. at 1201 n.19.
187. The Valdez court established a per se rule for the limited case in which a person
who knows a witness to be under suspicion is hypnotized for the purpose of iden-
tifying the perpetrator. Id. at 1202. However, the court specifically stated:
We do not formulate a per se rule of inadmissibility for cases not involv-
ing personal identification. In a particular case, the evidence favoring
admissibility might make the probative value of the testimony outweigh
its prejudicial effect. If adequate procedural safeguards have been fol-
lowed, corroborated post-hypnotic testimony might be admissible.
Id. at 1203.
188. The safeguards to which the Valdez court refers are those proposed by the expert
whose testimony formed the basis of the Hurd safeguards. Id. at 1202. See State
v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 96 (N.J. 1981); Martin Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypno-
sis in Court, 27 INT. J. CLmnCAL & EXPERmENTAL HYPNOsIs 311 (1979).
189. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1984). This analysis may
see greater use in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)(holding Frye not mandatory for novel
scientific evidence to be admissible because the Federal Rules of Evidence super-
sede Frye).
190. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1202 (5th Cir. 1984); State ex rel.
Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1273-75 (Ariz. 1982).
191. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, (Alaska 1986)(applying the state confrontation
clause).
192. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ariz. 1982).
193. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1984). The Valdez decision
is limited to instances in which a "hypnotized subject identifies for the first time a
person he has reason to know is already under suspicion" Id.
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ant's right to a fair trial.194 In United States v. Valdez,19 5 for exam-
ple, the witness, a police officer, knew Valdez was a suspect in the case
before he was hypnotized concerning the relevant incident. During
the hypnosis, several Texas Rangers, FBI agents, and an assistant
U.S. Attorney were present. A number of different persons asked
questions, some of which were related to information known by the
witness about Valdez.196 The court concluded the suggestive proce-
dures and prior information the witness had about Valdez created an
ideal situation for him to be led to believe he saw the defendant.197
E. Summary of Hypnosis Case Law
A majority of courts believe that hypnotically affected testimony,
even though it is lay testimony, is so affected by a scientific procedure
that the rules governing expert scientific evidence are applicable.19 s
One commentator explains this reasoning:
Although Frye did specifically deal with the testimony of an expert witness,
the reasoning underlying its holding is not restricted to expert testimony.
Frye requires that evidence derived from scientific principles be sufficiently
reliable and sets a standard for determining reliability. Nothing in Frye lim-
its it to only those instances in which the evidence is the testimony of an ex-
pert witness, nor is there any policy consideration that should so limit it.199
Courts have articulated several factors specific to hypnosis that
justify their application of Frye. First, the out-of-court scientific proce-
dure affects in-court testimony in intangible and untestable ways.
20 0
Hypnosis is designed to affect a person's memory and its purpose is to
reconstruct memories not recalled by the conscious mind.201 When a
previously hypnotized person testifies, the witness is able to confi-
dently assert facts presumptively not known without the aid of hypno-
sis, creating an impression that accurate testimony has been
produced. The hypnotized person is, however, extremely suggesti-
194. The Supreme Court has made it clear that a defendant's right to a fair trial can
be denied when police use unduly suggestive eyewitness identification proce-
dures. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
195. 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
196. For a discussion of the significance of the fact that hypnosis takes place out of
court, see Beaudine, supra note 133, at 405; and Kenneth G. Carroll, Note, The
Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223,
244-45 (1984).
197. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1202-03 (5th Cir. 1984).
198. See supra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
199. Shaw, supra note 155, at 19-20.
200. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
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ble202 and is later unable to distinguish pre-hypnotic from post-hyp-
notic memories.20 3
Second, there may be no way to recreate what happens during the
hypnosis session or to fairly test the accuracy of the testimony, either
through scientific means, cross-examination, or otherwise. 204 Hypno-
sis changes the demeanor of witnesses so the jury cannot see a 'before
and after" picture of the witness. Courts are extremely concerned
under such circumstances that the aura of science will influence juries
into accepting unreliable testimony as true.2 0 5 In particular, these
courts say a jury's normal ability to assess credibility is negated be-
cause the effects of the scientific procedure make witnesses appear
more credible than they are.20 6
Third, a case-by-case examination is viewed as a misuse of judicial
resources. As stated by the court in Contreras, the Frye test is judi-
cially manageable and provides for consistent application.207
Fourth, courts are concerned about the effect of hypnosis on the
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. Hypnosis often is used
by police to obtain an eyewitness identification. The hypnosis is con-
ducted by a police officer or by an outside expert while law enforce-
ment is present2O8 and the witness may feel pressure to be more
confident in answers. 209 Relying on a body of Supreme Court law
which prohibits overly suggestive eyewitness identification proce-
dures, 210 these courts hold that procedures surrounding hypnosis vio-
late a defendant's due process and confrontation rights.211 In many of
the hypnosis cases, these constitutional concerns either constitute an
independent reason to preclude hypnotically affected testimony,2 12 or
at the very least weigh heavily in decisions precluding such testimony
under Frye.213
202. The opportunity for facts to be suggested to the person are increased if the inter-
view takes place in the presence of law enforcement. See supra notes 194-96 and
accompanying text.
203. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
205. This assumption has been attacked as unsound. See 1 GIANNELLI & IM-
WINIELRIMD, supra note 144, § 1-5(E), at 22.
206. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 138 (Alaska 1986).
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 88 (N.J. 1981).
209. Id. at 93.
210. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1984).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 362, 367-68 (Va. Ct. App. 1991)(stat-
ing "although the use of post-hypnotic testimony may in some circumstances vio-
late a defendant's right to effective cross-examination, a per se ban on the use of
such testimony is not required by the Sixth Amendment").
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Citing these factors, courts have created rules either precluding all
hypnotically affected testimony or requiring extensive procedures en-
suring the objectivity of the hypnotic sessions. 214 These rules are re-
sponsive to perceived problems created by the fact that hypnosis does
not take place where the judge, jury, and opposing counsel can con-
temporaneously scrutinize it.
IV. LEGAL CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING FACILITATED
COMMUNICATION
Very few courts have specifically ruled on the admissibility of facil-
itated communication testimony. These few decisions nonetheless re-
flect the same divergence of opinion on facilitated communication that
exists within the scientific community.
The first reported case addressing the admissibility of facilitated
communication testimony is Department of Social Services v. Mark,215
decided by the family court of Ulster County, New York. The case in-
volved the removal of a 16-year-old non-verbal autistic child from her
parents' home. Through facilitation, the child disclosed that her fa-
ther sexually abused her. The court applied a Frye216 test to the out-
of-court disclosure, determining that since facilitated communication
exists in the "twilight zone" between experimental and demonstrable
scientific techniques, the child's statement "cannot be admitted into
evidence without testimony concerning the technique used to acquire
the statement."2 17 Following a pre-trial hearing in which expert testi-
mony concerning facilitated communication was received, the court
equated facilitated communication with hypnosis, polygraphs, rape
trauma syndrome, and other syndrome testimony. 218 Relying on this
precedent, the court found that facilitated communication had not
been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community and
therefore the statement made through facilitation was inadmissi-
ble.219 Further, the court determined that the relevant scientific
community had not accepted facilitated communication as "simultane-
ous transmission," and accordingly rejected an analogy to sign
language. 220
Similarly, in In re M.Z.,221 a New York family court held state-
ments obtained through facilitated communication inadmissible in a
214. See supra notes 156-73 and accompanying text.
215. 593 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
216. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See supra text accompanying
notes 141-50.
217. Department of Social Services v. Mark, 593 N.Y.S.2d 142, 146 (Faro. Ct. 1992).
218. Id. at 146-47.
219. Id. at 150.
220. Id. at 151.
221. 590 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Faro. Ct. 1992).
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child protective hearing because it viewed the technique as not gener-
ally accepted in the relevant scientific community.222 The court noted
that the judgment was not a reflection of the utility or reliability of
facilitated communication; the court's findings were based on the peti-
tioner's failure to establish a prima facie case as to the admissibility of
the facilitated testimony in that case.223
Two other New York cases, In re Luz224 and People v. Webb,225
held that facilitated communication testimony should be analyzed as a
matter of competency of witnesses rather than expert testimony. In
Luz, the trial court held a Frye hearing and determined that facili-
tated communication was not scientifically reliable and therefore tes-
timony given through facilitated communication could not be
presented. 226 On appeal, the Appellate Division analyzed the issue as
a question of competency rather than scientific reliability. The appel-
late court stated that when a witness is unable to communicate with-
out an interpreter, the court must appoint an interpreter who can
understand the witness.227
Comparing cases in which speech-impaired witnesses use sign lan-
guage translators or other interpreters, the court held that in-court
facilitated communication testimony cannot be excluded simply be-
cause the method of communication is not scientifically verified.22s
The court stated:
The test for the court in cases such as these is a pragmatic one. Can the inter-
preter, or in this case the facilitator, effectively communicate with the witness
and reliably convey the witness' answers to the court? A determination of
these questions does not require expert testimony. To the contrary, the prof-
fered facilitated communication lends itself to empirical rather than scientific
proof.2 2 9
Moreover, the court reasoned that questions may be asked in order to
deduce whether communication emanated from the witness or the
facilitator, and further, that courts should determine whether the
facilitator is qualified to interpret based on this in-court test.2 30
Addressing the applicability of the Frye test, the court pointed out
that qualifications of an interpreter are tested on a case-by-case basis
and are not subjected to a Frye test.231 The court stated that whether
a child is otherwise competent 232 is likewise determined by the trial
222. Id. at 399.
223. Id.
224. 595 N.Y.S.2d 541 (App. Div. 1993).
225. 597 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Crim. Ct. 1993).
226. In re Luz, 595 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (App. Div. 1993).
227. Id. at 543.
228. Id. at 544.
229. Id. at 545.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
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court. The opponent of the testimony has the burden of demonstrat-
ing the witness lacks testimonial capacity.2 33
Another New York court used similar reasoning in allowing grand
jury testimony through facilitated communication. In People v.
Webb,234 the court held it was proper to allow a facilitator to assist an
autistic child in testifying before a grand jury.23 5 The Webb court dis-
tinguished Mark and M.Z. because those cases dealt with prior out-of-
court statements obtained through facilitated communication. 236 In
Webb, by contrast, the witness used facilitated communication to tes-
tify in court where the grand jurors were able to see the witness under
oath and observe the procedure. Further, in order to prevent the
facilitator from hearing the questions; the facilitator wore earphones
through which "white noise" was transmitted.237 A Frye test was not
applied and the witness was allowed to attempt to demonstrate her
competence. 238
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Warden,239
ruled that a Frye test does not apply to facilitated communication tes-
timony. In Warden, the defendant worked as a caregiver at an institu-
tion where the victim, diagnosed with autism and profound mental
retardation, was a resident. Twelve years old at the time of trial, the
victim had no verbal skills and was believed to have mental skills
equivalent to those of a two- or three-year-old.
The victim began using facilitated communication with a speech
pathologist at the institution in February 1992, and by 1993 was able
to type with support to the forearm or elbow when he was calm. In the
233. In re Luz, 595 N.Y.S.2d 541, 546 (App. Div. 1993).
234. 597 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Grim. Ct. 1993).
235. Id. at 568. The court found error in allowing the facilitator's presence at the
grand jury proceeding, but held there was no possible prejudice from such error.
Id. at 569.
236. The significance in the difference in the facts of the cases should not be over-
looked. Mark and M.Z. considered the reliability of out-of-court statements,
whereas Luz and Webb assessed the admissibility of in-court statements. See
People v. Webb, 597 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568 (Crim. Ct. 1993). However, the broad lan-
guage in both Mark and M.Z. seems to create a blanket rule about the inadmissi-
bility of facilitated communication testimony. In fact, the lower court in Luz
relied on Mark to require a Frye hearing for the in-court statements. See In re
Luz, 595 N.Y.S.2d 541 (App. Div. 1993).
237. People v. Webb, 597 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (Crim. Ct. 1993).
238. The Webb court qualified its holding by stating that if, "contrary to the Court's
impression from review of the Grand Jury minutes," facilitated communication
does in fact involve a scientific technique, there would be "serious questions"
about whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Id. at 569. Therefore, the court stated it would hold a hearing to "inquire into the
technique and the mode of communication." At this hearing, the state is required
to prove the "claimed normality" of the technique. Id.
239. 891 P.2d 1074 (Kan. 1995).
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spring of 1992, the victim disclosed24o that the defendant241
sodomized him. The victim provided additional detail about the abuse
during an interview facilitated in the presence of a police officer. At
trial, the facilitator provided wrist support to the victim, who typed
short sentences and responded to yes and no questions on a
communicator. 242
The Kansas Supreme Court held, first, that a Frye test does not
apply to statements made through facilitated communication, finding
that facilitated communication is a method of communication not re-
quiring scientific interpretation.2 43 The court stated that the credibil-
ity of the statements are to be assessed by the jury. Second, the court
stated that certain procedures such as a facilitator wearing earphones
or diverting her eyes from the keyboard should be followed when using
facilitated communication to testify.24 4 The court further held that
the facilitator should be sworn to transmit the responses accu-
rately.2 45 Third, the court held that in assessing the reliability of the
240. The victim's disclosures came through a series of interviews with his facilitator
and the director of the psychology department of the institution. Id. at 1081-82.
241. The defendant confessed to the police that he had touched the victim's back with
his erect penis, and had pushed it up to the victim's anus, but claimed he did not
penetrate the victim. The defendant also admitted to a co-worker that he had
fondled the victim. Id. at 1083. Defendant recanted both the confession and ad-
mission at trial. Id. at 1084.
242. Id. at 1083.
243. Id. at 1088. The coures holding apparently applied both to out-of-court state-
ments and in-court testimony given through facilitated communication. This
lack of clarity may be significant. On one hand, it is a novel issue in either con-
text: can a court preclude in-court or out-of-court statements based purely on the
reliability of the method of communication as perceived by the scientific commu-
nity? Case law surrounding hypnotically affected testimony provides the most
relevant precedent. It can be argued that the reliability of out-of-court facilitated
communication statements is more closely analogous to the hypnosis process be-
cause both procedures occur out of court in a potentially suggestive environment.
However, an important difference with facilitated communication is that the
statements, whether in-court or out-of-court, can be tested for reliability through
other means, such as those mentioned in Warden. Id. at 1093. Reliability of hyp-
notically affected testimony, on the other hand, can never be tested.
A more significant issue for out-of-court facilitated communication statements
would arise when the victim is unavailable for trial and the Confrontation Clause
is implicated by introduction of hearsay without the opportunity for cross-exami-
nation of the declarant. In this instance, the reliability of the statements would
be directly at issue and closely scrutinized. The rationale of Supreme Court cases
examining the reliability of various hearsay exceptions when a witness is un-
available would be relevant to this situation. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805
(1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
244. State v. Warden, 891 P.2d 1074, 1093 (Kan. 1995). While such procedures were
not followed, the court found no error in the state's failure to use procedures in
this case, in part because defendant waited until immediately before the victim's
testimony to request a protocol. Id. at 1090.




victim's out-of-court statements for purposes of admitting them under
a special hearsay statute, the trial court implicitly made a finding the
victim was communicating and was competent. 24 6
Finally, the court enunciated several general rules. 24 7 First, the
court stated that trial courts should conduct a case-by-case assess-
ment of whether a witness is validly communicating through facili-
tated communication. The witness should be questioned outside the
presence of the jury to determine competence. 2 48 Second, trial courts
should devise procedures ensuring the trustworthiness of the testi-
mony. For example, witnesses should give independent responses
such as yes/no signs when possible, and the facilitator could wear ear-
phones or look away from the board249 when the witness is typing.2 50
Third, the witness should be sworn and the facilitator should be sworn
as an interpreter.2 51 Concluding its discussion of facilitated commu-
nication, the court stated:
[T]he jury observed for itself [the victim's] testimony through facilitated com-
munication and could decide what weight, if any, to give his testimony. The
jury heard testimony concerning the potential for facilitator influence or cuing
and the lack of quantitative research validating any facilitated communica-
tion. It cannot be said that no reasonable person would agree with the trial
court's ruling permitting [the victim] to testify.2 52
As evidenced by the relative paucity of case law and legal litera-
ture addressing facilitated communication, the debate over admissi-
bility is not fully developed. However, because of the vulnerability of
the autistic population to exploitation, the increasing use of facilita-
tion, and the unique legal issues posed by the use of this technique in
court, the controversy will not end soon.
If all witnesses are presumed competent and allowed to testify
without any inquiry regarding the use of the technique, courts could
be flooded with complaints of abuse. If facilitated communication is
subjected to the test of scientific reliability, however, many individuals
246. Id. at 1092. Factors such as the victim's ability to show affection and respond to
pictures, and the facilitator's lack of prior knowledge that the victim would allege
abuse were cited as supporting the validity of the communication. While the
Kansas Supreme Court indicated the trial court should have verified the validity
of the communication in different ways, it did not find reversible error in the trial
court's procedures. Id. at 1093.
247. Id. at 1093-94.
248. Id. at 1093.
249. Requiring the facilitator to be blindfolded or to look away from the board is not
advocated by proponents of facilitated communication. Biklen argues that visual
assistance is an integral part of facilitation and blindfolding techniques are likely
to interfere with communication. BrXLEN, COMMUNICATION UNBOUND, supra note
7, at 123-24. Biklen recommends a variety of other means for testing the validity
of communication. Id. at 124-31. See infra notes 317-28 and accompanying text.
250. State v. Warden, 891 P.2d 1074, 1093 (Kan. 1995).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1094.
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will be unfairly denied the opportunity to be heard. The following
Part proposes a method for analyzing in-court facilitated communica-
tion testimony taking into account both the need to provide all victims
of crime access to the courts and the need to ensure an acceptable level
of reliability for non-traditional forms of testimony.
V. APPLICATION OF PRECEDENT TO FACILITATED
COMMUNICATION
Legal precedent relevant to the admissibility of facilitated commu-
nication testimony can be divided into two categories. 253 The first cat-
egory involves cases in which out-of-court scientific procedures affect
the in-court testimony of a lay witness. Courts take three different
approaches in analyzing this category of cases. The first approach
treats such in-court testimony as novel scientific evidence254 and cre-
ates per se rules of exclusion on the ground that the out-of-court proce-
dure is not generally accepted in the scientific community.255 The
second approach requires proof that the out-of-court technique follows
procedures designed to produce reliable testimony.256 The third ap-
proach presumes the competency of all witnesses, admits their testi-
mony, and requires opponents to attack the credibility of their
testimony rather than its admissibility.257
The second category of relevant precedent involves cases in which
a third party assists a witness' in-court testimony.258 Courts analyz-
ing such cases presume that all witnesses are competent and admit
253. One significant body of relevant law that is not discussed in this Article is the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which itself raises a host of issues about categor-
ically depriving a class of disabled persons access to courts. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (Supp. 1994). Under the ADA a "disabled person" is someone who either
has, is regarded as having, or has a record of having, a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits that person in one or more major life activities. Id.
§ 12102[2]. Courts are required under the ADA to provide a qualified interpreter,
which is defined as an interpreter who is able to "interpret effectively, accurately,
and impartially. . . using any necessary specialized vocabulary." 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.104 (1994). See LINDA Kum, Title Il-Public Services, Subtitle A, Imple-
menting the Americans with Disabilities Act 100 (Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry
A- Beyer eds., 1993). The disabled individual's right to judicial access, whether
as a juror, witness or litigant, is rooted in §§ 12131-12165 of the Act, which pro-
hibit discrimination by public entities such as state and local courts. Id. For a
discussion of the ADA and facilitated communication, see Nancy M. Maurer, Fa-
cilitated Communication: Can Children with Autism Have a Voice in Court?, 6
AID. J. CoNTE'MP. LEGAL IssuEs 233, 260-70 (1995).
254. These cases primarily involve hypnotically affected testimony. See supra note
171 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 174-89 and accompanying text.




their testimony as long as the proponent of the testimony is able to
demonstrate some method by which the witness can communicate. 2 59
If the method of communication is shown to be potentially unreliable,
courts look to whether the interpreter is qualified, sworn, and suffi-
ciently impartial.260 Each case is analyzed on its facts and admissibil-
ity is determined on a case-by-case basis.261
Facilitated communication testimony involves issues presented by
both of these categories of cases: it could be classified as a scientific
procedure subject to special scrutiny or it could be viewed as lay testi-
mony subject only to traditional competency requirements. This Part
considers both views of facilitated communication testimony.
A. Cases Applying Frye to Testimony Affected by an Out-of-
Court Procedure
The strongest argument for precluding facilitated communication
testimony on Frye grounds is found in cases dealing with the admissi-
bility of hypnotically affected testimony.2 62 These cases warn that
courts should be hesitant to admit novel scientific evidence when the
scientific community itself does not accept the validity of the proce-
dure. Such testimony has the danger of improperly influencing a
jury's decision when the testimony is not proven to produce reliable
results. If admitted uncritically, testimony potentially influenced by
suggestion occurring during hypnosis may be accepted by a jury as
though it were accurately recalled from memory. By placing strict
limitations on the admissibility of this testimony, courts attempt to
ensure a higher degree of reliability derived from the use of this scien-
tific technique.
While the concerns present in hypnosis cases lead many courts to
apply the Frye test, the issues surrounding expert testimony and lay
testimony converge in such a way with facilitated communication as
to make a rule of per se exclusion based on Frye inappropriate.
First, the previously described dangers thought to be presented by
out-of-court hypnosis sessions are eliminated because facilitated com-
munication occurs in-court, subject to the scrutiny of judge, jury, and
party-opponent. 263 Courts are concerned that hypnotic interviews
conducted by police or with police present encourage witnesses to say
what the police suggest to them with no one to independently monitor
the hypnotic session. Once a suggestion is adopted by a hypnotized
witness, it becomes firmly a part of what the witness believes to be
accurate memory. Later cross-examination of the witness is thereby
259. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 84-106 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
263. See State v. Warden, 891 P.2d at 1074, 1094 (Kan. 1995).
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rendered ineffective, and courts contend the only protection against
the unreliable testimony is to preclude it altogether.
In-court facilitated testimony does not involve the same type of po-
tentially coercive out-of-court procedures involved in hypnotically af-
fected eyewitness identification.2 64 Regardless of prior disclosures
made through facilitation, a jury will assess in-court statements made
with facilitation. Opposing counsel can argue that the facilitator is
influencing the procedure and the jury will assess the validity of that
argument. The opponent also has the opportunity for effective cross-
examination; unlike hypnosis, there is no alteration of the witness'
memory by facilitation.
The second factor distinguishing hypnosis cases from facilitated
communication cases involves the court's ability to test the accuracy of
the results. While it is arguably impossible to test the potentially sug-
gestive effects of hypnosis on subsequent testimony, it is possible to
test whether facilitation is influenced by the facilitator.265 Because a
witness cannot recall a particular fact or set of facts before hypnosis,
there is no way to assess whether the hypnotically affected memory is
accurate. Once changed, the argument holds, the memory is changed
forever.
What is untestable in the context of hypnosis, however, is quite
testable with facilitation. In People v. Webb, for example, the
facilitator was unable to hear the questions posed to the witness, and
the court held the grand jury could assess whether communication
was occurring based on the responses to the questions.2 6 6 Because
such a test is possible with facilitation, the rationale applied to hypno-
sis cases is less compelling.267
With regard to testing reliability, facilitated communication testi-
mony is more comparable to testimony elicited from a witness in a
dissociative state. In Dorsey v. State,26s a victim of sexual assault ex-
hibited multiple personalities. All of the victim's personalities testi-
264. An opponent may argue that facilitators plant information in witnesses who re-
quire significant support to facilitate at the time of disclosure and that any later
disclosures are "tainted" by that earlier information. The earlier facilitation, the
argument goes, is a coercive pre-trial procedure, similar to improper hypnosis
techniques.
Such an argument assumes the initial disclosures made with hand or wrist
support are the result of cuing, coercion, or other improper behavior by the
facilitator and not legitimate communication. However, a witness who is able to
demonstrate an ability to accurately facilitate at the time of trial has demon-
strated an ability to communicate and there is no reason-other than specula-
tion-to assert that the witness was not communicating earlier in the process.
265. See infra notes 311-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legal context
in which a test should occur.
266. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
268. 426 S.E.2d 224 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
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fled at trial and were subject to cross-examination. 269 There is
uncertainty in the relevant scientific community regarding the relia-
bility of testimony from witnesses in a dissociative state: some argue
the testimony as a whole is unreliable because the witness is incoher-
ent and inconsistent, while others argue that the testimony elicited
from each personality is individually reliable.270 Although there is
substantial evidence supporting the existence of multiple personality
disorder,271 there is wide disagreement about the prevalence of the
disorder.272
The defendant in Dorsey argued that case law governing admissi-
bility of hypnotically affected testimony should control the admissibil-
ity of testimony by a witness with multiple personality disorder. He
further argued that such testimony should be per se inadmissible be-
cause there is disagreement in the scientific community as to the relia-
bility of testimony given by a person in a dissociative state.273 The
court rejected this argument and held the hypnosis case law inapplica-
ble, finding there are ways to test the reliability of testimony from a
person in a dissociative state. Significantly, the court noted that the
jury could observe the testimony and also that the witness was subject
to cross-examination. 274 The court stated:
The trial court properly recognized that if testimony from a person in a disso-
ciative state is never admissible, even if sufficient indicia of reliability are
present, persons aware of someone's dissociative disorder will be able to take
advantage of that condition with impunity. This we cannot allow.2 75
The rationale of Dorsey applies with equal force to facilitated com-
munication. The testimony of a person with a dissociative disorder
and facilitated communication testimony both involve procedures
which could be classified as scientific, whereby testimony could be pre-
cluded without examining the reliability of the testimony. However,
unlike hypnotically affected testimony, these types of testimony can be
269. Certain events normally trigger a person moving from a "host" personality (non-
dissociative) to a dissociative state. In Dorsey, the witness slipped into a child
personality when the prosecutor asked her about the abuse. For a useful discus-
sion of psychological defense mechanisms such as dissociation used by victims of
trauma, see LENORE TERR, UNCHAINED MEMORIES (1994).
270. See State v. Dorsey, 426 S.E.2d 224, 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). Experts for the
defendant argued that there was no real difference between multiple personality
disorder and hypnosis. The court rejected this argument, finding the spontane-
ous and involuntary nature of multiple personality disorder distinguishing. Id.
For a description of multiple personality disorder, see DSM-IV, supra note 5,
§ 300.13, at 487. The DSM-IV now terms the disorder Dissociative Identity Dis-
order, but the more familiar term Multiple Personality Disorder is used in this
Article.
271. See DSM-IV, supra note 5, § 300.13, at 484.
272. See DSM-lV, supra note 5, § 300.13, at 486.
273. Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 226-27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).




assessed for reliability. Neither of these classes of arguably novel tes-
timony should be precluded without providing the witness the oppor-
tunity to be heard.
The third argument for treating facilitated communication testi-
mony differently from hypnotically affected testimony is that facili-
tated communication does not alter a witness' demeanor to the
witness' advantage. One problem with hypnosis is the lack of any
method to test memories before and after hypnosis. The jury only sees
the post-hypnotic testimony and demeanor of the witness. Hypnosis is
challenged on confrontation grounds because the hypnosis alters the
witness' demeanor to the point that cross-examination is rendered
ineffective. Additionally, hypnosis has been held to violate due pro-
cess because of the "hyper-suggestible" nature of the out-of-court
interviews. 276
Neither of these concerns is present with facilitated communica-
tion testimony. There is no change in the witness' demeanor. The en-
tire procedure is visible to the judge and jury.277 Moreover, because of
motor disabilities and the physical appearance of many autistic peo-
ple, their presence before the jury may not be to their advantage:278
judges and juries may assume incompetence until competence is con-
vincingly demonstrated.279
Fourth, concerns about judicial economy are misplaced. Hypnosis
can never be entirely trusted because an individual's reconstructed
memories cannot be tested for accuracy. A per se rule may make eco-
nomic sense because, regardless of the amount of in-court testing, the
reliability of hypnotically affected memories will always be questiona-
276. See supra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
277. The procedure would take place in front of a judge alone if the competency hear-
ing were held outside the presence of the jury. For a discussion of holding the
competency hearing in front of the jury, see infra note 320. The jury will assess
the credibility of any witness found competent to testify at trial. The argument
about facilitator influence could be made at that stage and jurors could witness
the procedure and assess reliability for themselves.
278. Stereotyped body movements include the hands (clapping, finger flick-
ing) or whole body (rocking, dipping, and swaying). Abnormalities of
posture (e.g., walking on tiptoe, odd hand movements and body postures)
may be present. These individuals show a persistent preoccupation with
parts of objects (buttons, parts of the body). There may also be a fascina-
tion with movement (e.g., the spinning wheels of toys, the opening and
closing of doors, an electric fan or other rapidly revolving object). The
person may be highly attached to some inanimate object (e.g., a piece of
string or a rubber band).
DSM-IV, supra note 5, § 299.00, at 67.
279. For a discussion ofjurors' perceptions of children's credibility, see Gail Goodman
et al., Determinants of the Child Victim's Perceived Credibility, in PERSPECTVES
ON CILDEN'S ThEsTzioI 1 (S. Ceci et al., eds., 1989); Gail Goodman et al., Ju-
rors' Reactions to Child Witnesses, 40 J. Soc. Iss-Es 139 (1984). Many of the
stereotypes about children are compounded when the child is disabled.
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ble. This inability to determine reliability is due to the limited under-
standing in the scientific community of how the memory functions.
By contrast, if an individual can demonstrate his or her ability to
communicate, no judicial economy argument justifies excluding the
testimony.28 0 When an individual's communication can be verified as
actually occurring, that person should always have access to courts,
even if additional procedures are necessary to establish other aspects
of the person's competence. 281
In addition to the legal arguments, public policy considerations
also dictate against extending Frye to cases involving facilitated com-
munication. Fye began as a rule to limit expert testimony about sci-
entific methods not proven to accurately measure what they purport
to measure. Frye was later extended to "soft" sciences such as psychol-
ogy when those disciplines appeared to produce previously unknown
types of evidence.282 The broad acceptance of this extension of Frye
opened a new door for excluding previously admissible lay testi-
mony.283 Taking the test yet a further step, however, goes beyond the
legitimate uses of the rule and improperly prohibits a class of wit-
nesses from testifying without considering the facts of each case.
The tendency of courts to overextend Frye is illustrated in State v.
Valera.284 In Valera, a therapist used "relaxation therapy" to help a
child feel comfortable talking. In doing so, the therapist asked the
280. As stated by Wigmore:
It is clear that testimony must not be allowed to fail if some process of
interpretation is available. The conditions under which it is to be re-
sorted to are the simple dictates of cautious common sense: (1) Interpre-
tation is proper to be resorted to whenever a necessity exists, but not till
then[;]... (2) If interpretation is necessary, and no adequate means of
securing it is practicable, the testimony is lost, for without adequate
communication there can be no testimony[;] ... (3) What sort of a person
is a proper one to be interpreter, is a question depending much on the
circumstances; and should be determined by the trial judge.
2 WiGMORE, supra note 42, § 811, at 277-81 (emphasis in original)(citations
omitted).
281. See supra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
282. McCord explains:
Both the Frye rule and the "relevance analysis" as currently formulated
are more easily and more often applied to "hard" scientific evidence, such
as neutroa activation analysis, and gas chromatograph analysis.
'Novel" psychological evidence, which is "soft" and subjective, is a rela-
tive newcomer to the Frye scene, although it now seems to have arrived
with a vengeance.
McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony, supra note 144, at 27 (footnotes
omitted).
The Frye test has long been criticized on a variety of grounds, one of which is
that it is selectively applied. See Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining
a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. Rav. 879, 886-905 (1982)(discussing
decisions that have modified or rejected a Frye standard).
283. See 1 MYERs, supra note 50, § 4.18, at 265.
284. 817 P.2d 731 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
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child to take deep breaths, notice sounds outside, and think about
what she was feeling.28 5 The child disclosed sexual abuse by the de-
fendant during the relaxation therapy session. Prior to the disclosure,
the child had made no mention of sexual abuse; the therapist thought
the child had been suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder from
a recent car accident.286 The child did not claim to have forgotten the
memories; rather, she disclosed the abuse because she felt safe and
trusted the therapist.28 7
The trial court applied a Hurd-type test to the procedure and de-
termined that because the Hurd procedures for hypnotically affected
testimony had not been followed, the child's disclosure of abuse was
inadmissible. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed this deci-
sion, finding that the technique used by the therapist did not create
the same problems of traditional hypnosis cases. 288 First, the court
ruled that relaxation therapy did not present problems of reliability.
Second, the court found it significant that the technique was not used
in a forensic setting; in fact, the therapist was surprised by the disclo-
sure.28 9 The court held that the Hurd safeguards simply did not apply
to this situation.290 Therefore, the testimony of the child witness was
admissible.
The trial courts ruling in Valera reflects the ease with which lay
testimony can be improperly cast as scientific evidence and precluded.
Even though the concerns of hypnosis were not present in this case,291
the trial court accepted the defendant's characterization of the ther-
apy as a scientific technique, and simply precluded the lay testimony
under Frye. Exclusion of all facilitated communication testimony
would be a further step in this misguided direction.
Another troubling aspect of applying Frye to facilitation is that fa-
cilitation occurs at many levels. At its most supportive level, the tech-
nique involves a facilitator who supports the hand of the witness while
the witness types. The facilitator holds the witness' hand with every
touch on the keyboard. This level of facilitation is the most frequently
285. The therapist labelled her technique "Ericksonian hypnosis," but stated that
practitioners of "classical hypnosis" would not call her procedure hypnosis.
286. The child had displayed behavior and emotional symptoms consistent with Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder. See DSM-1V, supra note 5, § 309.81, at 424.
287. State v. Velera, 817 P.2d 731, 733 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
288. The court stated the record was inadequate for it to address the issue of whether
a Hurd test ought to be applied to this type of hypnosis. Id. at 734. The court
stated it was not necessary to answer this question because it was able to distin-
guish the case from traditional hypnosis cases even under the Hurd guidelines.
289. Id. at 734.
290. Id. at 735.




attacked by critics on the basis of facilitator influence. 292 This is only
one level of facilitation, however. Many people only need a facilitator
to hold their elbow or sleeve while typing.2 93 These methods of sup-
port, while still involving touching, provide little possibility of gui-
dance by the facilitator.294 Moreover, many students eventually are
able to type without any physical contact,295 though they may still
require the facilitator's physical proximity.2 96 Certainly, in instances
of minimal facilitator contact there can be no real possibility of the
facilitator guiding or influencing the person's typing, yet this facilita-
tion could be deemed inadmissible under a per se rule.29 7
292. Even the strongest proponents of facilitation agree that influence is always possi-
ble at this level. Bilden, Autism and Praxis, supra note 7, at 297. Thus, guide-
lines have been established for proper facilitation when hand support is provided.
BIKLEN, COMMUNICATION UNBOUND, supra note 7, at 128 (emphasizing the need
for the facilitator to make sure the student is looking at the keyboard); CROSSLEY,
FACILITATED COMnmUNCATION TRAINING, supra note 7, at 43-46.
293. This is the level of support sometimes used by the child in State v. Warden, 891
P.2d 1074, 1080 (Kan. 1995), although he needed wrist support to testify at trial.
Id. at 1083.
294. Prior and Cummins argue that through elaborate cuing, a presumably illiterate
and unintelligent person is able to punch the right keys to write coherent state-
ments and carry on discussions. CumiNs & Po i, supra note 15, at 232-33.
Biklen challenges them to explain how touching a student's shoulder can influ-
ence the student to write complex sentences. Biklen, Free Speech, supra note 7,
at 249.
295. BIKLEN, COMMUNICATION UNBOUND, supra note 7, at 130. That many people
achieve independence is in itself a compelling argument for the validity of facili-
tated communication. Without facilitation, the person never would have begun
typing nor gained the ability to type independently.
296. CROSSLEY, FACILITATED COMMUNICATION TRAINING, supra note 7, at 59. Research-
ers do not know why physical presence is necessary but hypothesize that, espe-
cially with autistic people, the emotional support is important. Id. at 67 n.4.
297. This potential "parade of horrors" is not an irrational threat or a baseless claim.
Courts-as well as the attorneys practicing before the courts-have long pre-
ferred bright line tests. For example, for years all disabled victims were pre-
cluded from testifying when their attackers were charged under rape statutes
against a person "incapable through unsound mind of giving legal consent." Wil-
kinson v. People, 282 P. 257, 257 (Colo. 1929). Courts reasoned that if the person
was incapable of giving legal consent to the intercourse, he or she was necessarily
incompetent to testify at the trial. Lee v. State, 64 S.W. 1047 (Tex. Crim. App.
1901). Thus, the incapacity which was an essential element of the crime always
made the victim of such a crime incompetent to testify. The rule resulted from
the attempt of courts to create a bright line rule: all victims incapable of giving
consent to rape are automatically excluded as witnesses.
Wigmore claimed that the Lee opinion and other like decisions committed "an
absurdity in the name of the law," 2 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 498, at 501, and
the rule has long since been uniformly rejected. See id. at 706 ("It may be noted
here that capacity to consent to a rape, being a question of the criminal law, is not
to be used as the standard for capacity to testify; hence a female legally incapable
of such consent may still be mentally able to give a dependable account as a wit-
ness.")(emphasis and footnotes omitted). In rejecting the rule presuming incom-
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B. Cases Not Applying Frye to Testimony Affected by an
Out-of-Court Procedure
Not all courts extend Frye to lay testimony affected by out-of-court
scientific procedures. A number of courts-led by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Brown v. State2 9S-continue to treat such evidence
as lay testimony which should be assessed by traditional tests of credi-
bility rather than in terms of scientific testimony.2 99 These courts
hold that a test designed for "pseudo-scientific data"300 should not be
used to categorically eliminate the testimony of lay witnesses.30 1 In-
stead, these courts reason that in-court testimony of lay witnesses
should be admissible so long as the witness is competent and the testi-
mony is relevant.30 2 Following this rationale, these courts have estab-
lished that determining competence and relevance on a case-by-case
basis and attacking credibility through in-court cross-examination
should be the first, rather than the last, resort.3 0 3 These cases, as well
as others discussing competency generally,304 guide establishment of
a structure for analyzing facilitated communication testimony.
petence of such witnesses, the Colorado Supreme Court, demonstrating an
enlightened view, stated:
Offenses, such as the one under consideration, are committed in secret,
and, if we hold that the weak in mind and feeble in intellect are incompe-
tent to testify as witnesses, simply because they are incapable of giving
legal consent, we would, by our decision, rob these unfortunates of all the
protection of our laws, and such instances of depravity and immorality
as we have considered here could be carried on by the lowest of human-
ity without fear of punishment.
Wilkinson v. People, 282 P. 257, 260 (Colo. 1929). See also Sanchez v. State, 479
S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)(overruling Lee v. State, 64 S.W. 1047 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1901)).
A rule completely eliminating all facilitated communication testimony would
create an extremely bright line, precluding an entire class of witnesses in much
the same manner as the Lee rule. Such a rule would indeed rob this class of
victims of the protection of our laws and would heighten the possibility of crimes
being carried out without fear of punishment.
298. 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983).
299. While Brown and other cases following this reasoning have been severely criti-
cized by some courts and commentators, the principles underlying these courts'
decisions are relevant to facilitated communication testimony. Brown is most
harshly criticized as naively assuming that hypnosis does not affect a "present
recollection refreshed" analysis. Nonetheless, the principles concerning lay and
expert testimony expressed in Brown are sound and compelling in the context of
facilitated communication See supra notes 174-89 and accompanying text.
300. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 n.19 (5th Cir. 1984).
301. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
302. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1984). If a witness is
found competent, the testimony should be considered relevant inasmuch as the
scientific procedure employed in the case has already been tested and shown
reliable.
303. Id.
304. See supra notes 37-62 and accompanying text.
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1. Step One: Determining the Qualifications of the Interpreter
Courts begin any competency analysis by examining whether a
witness can perceive events, remember those events, communicate his
or her memory, and understand the duty to tell the truth.305 At issue
with facilitated communication is whether the witness can communi-
cate.30 6 In sign language and foreign language translation cases, this
prong is established by proving that a translator is qualified to trans-
late for the particular witness. When standard qualifying factors do
not exist,30 7 as with idiosyncratic communication, the form of the as-
sessment is case-specific.308 Courts examining the qualifications of an
interpreter of idiosyncratic communication employ a common sense3 09
examination of the abilities of the translator, such as the translator's
training and experience with the witness.31o
With facilitated communication, assessing qualifications requires
examining the length of time the facilitator has worked with the wit-
ness and the success of the facilitator communicating with other stu-
dents,311 reviewing the facilitator's training,312 and examining the
method of facilitation used.313 Factors to consider include whether
the facilitator uses wrist, elbow, shoulder, or some other form of
support.
If the student types with minimal shoulder support or even with
elbow support, the court may reasonably determine that no influence
is possible and not require further testing. Competency also may be
established through records,3 14 through the testimony of people who
305. 2 WiGMoRE, supra note 42, § 478, at 636.
306. Facilitators also can be challenged based on inexperience and failure to follow
accepted protocol. For example, Biklen and others insist that a person should not
facilitate if the witness is looking away from the keyboard. Biklen, Autism and
Praxis, supra note 7, at 307. This and other standards are being developed by
persons who facilitate. Id.
307. When possible, proving qualification can be done through standardized means
such as foreign language and sign language certification. See supra notes 69-71
and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
309. Watson v. State, 596 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
310. See supra cases cited in note 125.
311. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
312. Training is available for facilitators and standards exist for determining proper
facilitation techniques. Biklen, Autism and Praxis, supra note 7, at 307.
313. See In re Luz, 595 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (App. Div. 1993).
314. State v. Dighera, 617 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)(trial court's determination
of competency based solely on the witness' records from a mental institution was




know the witness and can vouch as to the accuracy of the communica-
tion,31 5 or through testimony of facilitators themselves.316
If the student requires hand or wrist support, examination of the
circumstances may lead to in-court testing of the procedure.317 As
stated by the court in Luz:
The test for the court in cases such as these is a pragmatic one. Can the inter-
preter, or in this case the facilitator, effectively communicate with the witness
and reliably convey the witness's answers to the court? A determination of
these questions does not require expert testimony. To the contrary, the prof-
fered facilitated communication lends itself to empirical rather than scientific
proof.... Fact specific questions can be devised which should demonstrate
whether the answers are subject to the influence, however subtle, of the
facilitator. If the court is satisfied from this demonstration that the facilitator
is "qualified" to transmit communications from Luz to the court, then the
facilitator may be appointed as an interpreter.31 8
Any test conducted at a competency hearing should be structured
in such a way as to allow the student to practice and become comforta-
ble with the format of the test,31 9 and the purpose of the test should be
explained to the witness.3 2 0 Tests also must be conducted more than
315. Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)(school superintendent
testified that students were taught it was wrong to lie, demonstrating that the
witness would know the difference between truth and falsity).
316. State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93 (1830)(interpreter testified that student could read,
write, and knew sign language).
317. Some individuals may object to the idea of any testing whatsoever on the ground
that it is not required in idiosyncratic cases or any other cases in which a witness
cannot communicate through traditional means. The potential for influence is
just as great in idiosyncratic cases and the inability to test is the same; in fact,
the tests proposed for facilitation could have been used in these cases but appar-
ently such a procedure was not contemplated.
However, testing is justifiable with facilitated communication involving maxi-
mum support because of the extent of unintentional influencing demonstrated by
the literature. Unlike translation of idiosyncratic testimony in which there is no
reason to believe the communication may be inaccurate, the scientific literature
related to facilitated communication does create such a belief, which justifies re-
quiring individual facilitators to demonstrate their ability to facilitate accurately.
Moreover, as argued in this Article, testing is a last resort, not the first approach,
and competency may be shown through other means in some cases.
318. In re Luz 595 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (App. Div. 1993).
319. B EN, ComwrUCATIoN UNBoUND, supra note 7, at 31. Because autistic and
other disabled witnesses object to having their intelligence questioned and tested
(as all people do), a testing environment itself can impede success. Therefore, it
is necessary to familiarize the student with the test format and allow time for the
student to become comfortable with the test. Allowing child witnesses to become
familiar with the courtroom and court processes is common. See State v. Osborn,
490 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Neb. 1992).
320. Courts generally have the discretion to determine whether to conduct this hear-
ing in front of the jury. FED. R. Evin. 104(c). See supra note 127 and accompany-
ing text. See also 1 MYERs, supra note 50, § 2.18, at 124. A proponent of
facilitated communication testimony may want to consider moving to hold the
hearing in the presence of the jury in order to eliminate the need for the witness
being tested twice. While courts usually have the authority to allow such an unu-
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once. Recent research has demonstrated that, under test conditions, a
student who can successfully pass messages3 21 one day may not be
able to the next day.3 22 Consequently, it may be necessary to try the
test more than once. If a student cannot pass messages consistently
enough to satisfy the court, the student may then be found incompe-
tent to testify. On the other hand, the circumstances surrounding one
or more failures in a series of tests may leave the court convinced that
communication is occurring, particularly where reasons are articu-
lated explaining why the student failed. Additionally, tests should
take place in a comfortable and familiar environment. Courts should
be able to accommodate the needs of autistic individuals just as they
have accommodated the needs of children and other witnesses.323
Further, a test must be used that has a proven ability to demon-
strate successful message passing. A variety of options are available
for structuring the tests themselves.3 24 The Luz court suggested ask-
ing questions to the witness outside the presence of the facilitator,
with the facilitator present only when the response is given.325 An-
other option involves using earphones through which "white noise" is
played to prevent the facilitator from hearing the questions.3 26 In a
case in Maryland, a reading comprehension test was attempted in
which the student read two short paragraphs that the facilitator did
not read, then attempted to answer questions based on the read-
ings. 3 27 Such a test can demonstrate an ability to communicate as
well as an ability to perform at higher levels of cognition.328 Another
sual step, most courts will be reluctant to risk the prejudice to the jury due to the
risk of the witness being found incompetent. See id. at n.342. However, in an
exceptional case in which a witness may not have the ability to pass two rounds
of tests, the proponent should consider this option.
321. The term "pass messages" is used to describe the ability to communicate a word
or phrase.
322. See supra note 25.
323. See 2 MYERS, supra note 50, § 8.3, at 327-29.
324. Proponents of facilitated communication have several recommendations for con-
structing validation tests. See BIKLEN, COMUNICATION UNBOUND, supra note 7,
at 127-31; Douglas Biklen et al., How Teachers Confirm the Authorship of Facili-
tated Communication: A Portfolio Approach, 20 J. Ass'N PERSONS WITH SEVERE
HAt-icAPs 45 (1995). Authors of recent research emphasize the inadequacy of
single point-in-time tests and provide additional suggestions for validating com-
munication. Cardinal et al., supra note 24.
325. In re Luz, 595 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (App. Div. 1993). This is the type of assessment
used in the Cardinal study. See supra notes 24-25.
326. This is the technique used by the court in People v. Webb. 597 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567
(Crim. Ct. 1993).
327. Meyer, supra note 13, at B5. In this case, the trial judge indicated that he would
determine the validity of facilitated communication testimony on a case-by-cases
basis. Id. While precluding the witness' testimony on the ground that the wit-
ness could not answer the questions correctly, the court added: "'Tm not con-
vinced the method cannot work." Id.
328. See Cardinal et al., supra notes 24-25.
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possible test is to ask the student questions for which the facilitator
has no way of knowing the answer and which can be independently
verified.329
2. Step Two: Swearing the Interpreter
In addition to finding the facilitator qualified, courts must place
the facilitator under oath.330 Swearing the facilitator will provide the
same check against intentional misinterpretation as it does with any
other translation case.331 Just as there is no way for a judge to know
whether foreign language or sign language interpreters are translat-
ing accurately, there is no way to ensure the truthfulness of individual
facilitators.33 2
It may be argued that swearing the interpreter is irrelevant be-
cause critics do not claim that facilitators intentionally misinterpret;
rather, it is claimed that facilitators unintentionally give their views
rather than those of the witness. 333 The problem with facilitation, it
is argued, is that to all appearances it is legitimate because even the
facilitator completely believes its accuracy, but when tested it is
shown to be the facilitator rather than the witness communicating.334
If, in fact, a facilitator's translation is the result of unintentional
facilitator influence, such inaccurate translations will be discovered in
assessing the facilitator's qualifications.335 Facilitators who can
demonstrate they are qualified-either through in-court testing or
other methods-have necessarily demonstrated that they can success-
fully pass a variety of messages without influencing the process. If a
disclosure of abuse is somehow unintentionally emanating only from
the facilitator, the facilitator will not be able to demonstrate he or she
is qualified.
Once a facilitator demonstrates an ability to pass messages suc-
cessfully, the oath protects against intentional influence by the
facilitator. The oath-backed by the punishments accompanying per-
jury and contempt of court-is the only protection against any witness
329. Bm N, COSIMUNICATION UNBOUND, supra note 7, at 129.
330. State v. Warden, 891 P.2d 1074, 1093 (Kan. 1995).
331. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
332. Claims of intentional misrepresentation are rarely made in other interpretation
cases today. Rather the oath is seen as a prophylactic devise, reminding all wit-
nesses of their obligation to state the truth.
333. Susan Moore et al., Facilitator-Suggested Conversational Evaluation, supra note
16, at 547 (The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from these observa-
tions is that these particular observed communications are originating from the
facilitators.").
334. See supra note 16.
335. See Biklen, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 249. That facilitators can influence
short, uncomplicated answers is shown in various studies and recognized by most
researchers of facilitated communication. Id.
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deliberately misleading a tribunal. In this regard facilitated commu-
nication testimony is no different from any other testimony.
3. Step Three: Assessing Unfair Bias
Finally, courts must determine whether a facilitator is biased to a
degree creating unfair prejudice.336 Because many autistic individu-
als have shown strong preferences in people with whom they will facil-
itate,337 it is not always possible to provide completely disinterested
interpreters. Further, due to the individual techniques and feedback
inherent in the process, the facilitator and witness typically must
have a relationship of mutual understanding and trust. Such rela-
tionships rarely rise to the level of disqualifying bias in translation
cases.338 If a facilitator is challenged, bias can be assessed by tradi-
tional and familiar methods.339
4. Burdens of Proof
Every witness is presumed competent.340 Based on the literature
and the testimony of experts341 related to facilitated communication,
an opponent of facilitated communication testimony would attempt to
demonstrate that there is sufficient concern regarding the reliability
of the technique to challenge the presumption of competence. Scien-
tific evidence alone would likely be insufficient to meet the opponent's
burden.342 The opponent must make a prima facie showing that the
witness is not actually communicating.3 43 If the opponent makes this
initial showing, a competency hearing would be held for the opponent
to demonstrate that the witness is not communicating.3 44 At this
hearing, both the opponent and proponent would have the opportunity
to present evidence, and the burden would be on the opponent to over-
come the presumption of competence.34 5
336. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
337. In fact, facilitators are predominantly teachers, counselors, or family members.
BIKLEN, CoMMuNIcATIoN UNBoUND, supra note 7, at 74-75. In State v. Warden,
891 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Kan. 1995), the witness was able to facilitate with several
people, but would only facilitate with one individual at the sexual abuse trial. Id.
at 1083.
338. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
342. No amount of general scientific data based on a larger population of people who
facilitate would be able to provide the requisite individualized proof that a spe-
cific witness is unable to communicate. See supra note 83 and accompanying
text.
343. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
344. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 484, at 641-42.
345. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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C. The Role of Expert Testimony
There are two possible roles for expert testimony in determining
the competence of a witness to testify with facilitated communication.
First, experts may be called upon by the opponent attempting to make
the necessary prima facie showing of the witness' incompetence. 34 6 A
likely subject of expert witness testimony at the competency hearing
would be studies purporting to show the existence of facilitator influ-
ence, especially if wrist or arm facilitation is used.347 Another argua-
bly relevant area of expert testimony would be research indicating
that communication does not occur with facilitation. 34 8 This testi-
mony might provide the prima facie showing necessary for an oppo-
nent to challenge an individual's ability to communicate. Of course, at
this stage, the proponent also may make use of expert testimony to
present an opposing scientific point of view.349
The second possible place for expert testimony is at trial. If the
witness is found competent, the proponent probably will want to re-
peat the tests used to establish competency to convince the jury that
the witness is in fact communicating.3 50 The opponent can then cross-
examine the facilitator, the witness, or the proponent's expert based
on results from the in-court test. The opponent also can present com-
mon sense arguments or expert testimony about influence. The pre-
cise parameters of expert testimony would depend on the facts of a
particular case, but might include research about subconscious cuing,
the "Clever Hans" effect,351 or other information the court deems
relevant.352
The proponent could justifiably object to expert testimony on the
grounds of relevance: it is not relevant that other persons cannot com-
346. A Frye or comparable challenge is inapplicable at this stage because such prelimi-
nary questions are not governed by the rules of evidence. Federal Rules of Evi-
dence Rule 104 states:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges. [Subdivision (b) relates to the
relevancy of evidence which depends on the fulfillment of a condition of
fact.]
FED. R. Evm. 104(a).
347. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 333.
349. See supra note 346.
350. Repeating tests can have a positive or negative effect on the witness. Success-
fully proving competence the first time may give the witness more confidence in
front of the jury. However, given the difficulties involved in testing, the propo-
nent always runs the risk of not adequately proving the validity of communica-
tion in front of the jury.
351. See supra note 18.
352. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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municate through this means if it has been shown that the particular
witness is able to communicate. Expert testimony probably would be
admitted to permit a defendant the fullest possible cross-examination,
although courts that do not view facilitated communication as a scien-
tific technique may not allow such testimony.3 53
VI. CONCLUSION
Increasing use of facilitated communication inevitably will result
in increased reports of abuse. Courts and attorneys handling such
cases need a framework for analyzing the unique legal issues
presented by the prospect of facilitated communication testimony.
Two diverse bodies of case law provide relevant precedent for deter-
mining the admissibility of facilitated communication testimony.
One body of case law holds that the scientific laboratory rather
than the courtroom is the proper place to test novel scientific testi-
mony. In the context of facilitated communication, this case law pro-
vides a necessary limitation on the evidentiary use of new scientific
techniques. The rule must not, however, be extended beyond its
proper application or used as a short-cut bypassing traditional and
effective methods of assessing reliability.
In the case of facilitated communication, application of a Frye test
is inappropriate for several reasons. First, facilitated communication
occurs in front of the jury where the reliability of the testimony can be
evaluated by the finder of fact. Second, when necessary, the accuracy
of the translation can be assessed by objective means, through an ap-
propriate in-court test. Finally, denying a victim access to the courts
because of the failure of other victims to satisfy experts as to their
competency is manifestly unjust.
More applicable to facilitated communication testimony is prece-
dent governing the competency of witnesses who testify through a
translator. Recognizing that the reliability of facilitated communica-
tion is debated in the academic community, it nonetheless remains lay
testimony when a witness desiring to speak with the assistance of a
facilitator is presented to the court. Because it is lay testimony, facili-
tated communication testimony should be analyzed as translated tes-
timony, with appropriate safeguards ensuring that only competent
witnesses testify.
To ensure that a facilitator is qualified to translate, the facilitator
must demonstrate his or her qualifications by showing that he or she
can accurately facilitate with the witness. This may be proven
through testimony of the facilitator or other witnesses; evidence of
out-of-court tests which demonstrate an ability to accurately trans-
353. See, e.g., In re Luz, 595 N.Y.S.2d 541 (App. Div. 1993)(analyzing facilitation as a
matter of competency rather than a scientific technique).
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late; or in-court testing of the facilitation with the facilitator and the
student. As long as the facilitator and the witness are sworn and the
facilitator is not unfairly biased, the testimony should be admitted.
Courts have long wrestled with balancing the reliability of testi-
mony of disabled victims with the right of the victim to be heard.
While courts are justifiably cautious when testimony is produced with
the assistance of techniques that appear to be cloaked with science,
they likewise must be careful not to exclude witnesses without giving
each witness the opportunity to demonstrate his or her competence. It
would be unjust for an individual witness to be barred from the court-
room on the basis of other disabled persons' inability to pass tests. By
way of analogy, it could hardly be argued that because some children
of a particular age are not competent, no child in that age group is
competent.
Existing procedures for determining the competency of witnesses
and qualifications of translators ensure that unreliable testimony is
not presented while at the same time allowing communication that
can be proven trustworthy to be admitted. If these procedures are fol-
lowed, justice for victims as well as accused can be attained.
